CVE-2025-4382: Grub2: grub allow access to encrypted device through cli once root device is unlocked via tpm
A flaw was found in systems utilizing LUKS-encrypted disks with GRUB configured for TPM-based auto-decryption. When GRUB is set to automatically decrypt disks using keys stored in the TPM, it reads the decryption key into system memory. If an attacker with physical access can corrupt the underlying filesystem superblock, GRUB will fail to locate a valid filesystem and enter rescue mode. At this point, the disk is already decrypted, and the decryption key remains loaded in system memory. This scenario may allow an attacker with physical access to access the unencrypted data without any further authentication, thereby compromising data confidentiality. Furthermore, the ability to force this state through filesystem corruption also presents a data integrity concern.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
This flaw can undermine disk encryption on specially configured systems when an attacker has physical access. If GRUB automatically unlocks a LUKS disk through the TPM, filesystem corruption can force rescue mode after decryption, potentially exposing readable data without additional authentication and risking unauthorized modification.
Executive priority
Prioritize systems that are portable, unattended, deployed in accessible locations, or contain sensitive regulated data. This is not an internet-scale emergency, but affected configurations weaken a foundational encryption control. Expedite vendor review and remediation where realistic physical access could produce material data exposure.
Technical view
GRUB loads the TPM-held LUKS decryption key and unlocks the root device before confirming that its filesystem is usable. A corrupted superblock can make filesystem discovery fail and invoke rescue mode while the device remains decrypted and key material remains in memory. The reported impact is high confidentiality and integrity loss, with no availability impact.
Likely exposure
Exposure requires LUKS disk encryption, GRUB TPM-based automatic decryption, and attacker physical access sufficient to corrupt the underlying filesystem. The bundle marks Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7, 8, 9, and 10, plus OpenShift Container Platform 4, as affected. Systems without this configuration are unlikely to meet the described conditions.
Exploitation context
The CVSS score is 5.9 with physical attack vector, low complexity, and no user interaction. The bundle states that CISA KEV status is false and provides no evidence of active exploitation. Practical abuse depends on local physical access and a narrowly defined boot and encryption configuration.
Researcher notes
The weakness aligns with missing authentication after TPM-assisted decryption and rescue-mode entry. The supplied upstream GRUB diff indicates code-level remediation activity, but the bundle does not identify fixed downstream package versions or confirm backports. Validation should focus on configuration and vendor package status, not destructive exploitation.
Mitigation direction
Check Red Hat guidance for applicable fixed packages or supported mitigations.
Apply vendor-provided GRUB updates after testing boot and recovery behavior.
Restrict physical access to exposed endpoints, servers, and removable storage interfaces.
Review whether TPM automatic disk unlocking is necessary for each affected system.
Maintain tested backups to address potential filesystem integrity damage.
Validation and detection
Inventory systems using GRUB, LUKS, and TPM-based automatic root-device unlocking.
Map installed Red Hat and OpenShift versions against current vendor advisories.
Verify installed GRUB package versions after applying vendor-provided updates.
Confirm physical security controls for portable, remote, and unattended systems.
Avoid destructive reproduction on production disks; use isolated test systems if vendor guidance requires testing.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
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ATT&CK lookup starting points
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cwe · medium confidence lookup
CWE-306: Credential and account abuse lookup
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The affected technology mentions containers, so container-specific ATT&CK technique review may help. This is a Glexia inferred lookup path, not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, or CVE Program mapping.
These fields come from the CVE record and ADP containers, not from Glexia's Take. They preserve time-varying source decisions such as CISA SSVC, KEV status, CVSS metrics, and provider references.
1CVSS vectors
5Timeline events
1ADP providers
4Source links
SSVC decision data
CISA-ADPCISA Coordinator
Timestamp
Version
2.0.3
Exploitation: noneAutomatable: noTechnical Impact: total
CVSS vector scores
1 official score
We collect every scored CVSS vector available in the official CNA and ADP containers. When more than one version is present, the table keeps the source vectors side by side instead of collapsing them into the highest score.