CVE-2025-39718: vsock/virtio: Validate length in packet header before skb_put()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock/virtio: Validate length in packet header before skb_put()
When receiving a vsock packet in the guest, only the virtqueue buffer
size is validated prior to virtio_vsock_skb_rx_put(). Unfortunately,
virtio_vsock_skb_rx_put() uses the length from the packet header as the
length argument to skb_put(), potentially resulting in SKB overflow if
the host has gone wonky.
Validate the length as advertised by the packet header before calling
virtio_vsock_skb_rx_put().
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
This is a Linux kernel virtualization bug. A Linux guest receiving virtio-vsock traffic could trust a packet header length before copying data into a socket buffer, creating a possible buffer overflow if the host sends malformed data. The business concern is concentrated in virtualized Linux environments, not ordinary network-facing services.
Executive priority
Treat this as a virtualization hardening update. It is not confirmed as actively exploited, but affected Linux guests using virtio-vsock should be patched through normal emergency or accelerated kernel maintenance, especially where host trust is limited.
Technical view
The vulnerable path is virtio vsock receive handling in the guest. The code validated the virtqueue buffer size but passed the packet header length into skb_put() without first validating that header length, allowing potential SKB overflow. Kernel stable commits add length validation before virtio_vsock_skb_rx_put().
Likely exposure
Exposure is most likely in Linux guests where virtio-vsock is enabled or provided by a virtualization platform. The CVE data lists Linux kernel lines as affected, but distribution and appliance impact depends on vendor packaging and backports.
Exploitation context
The bundle does not show CISA KEV listing, public exploitation, exploit code, or a CVSS score. The described trigger requires a malformed virtio-vsock packet from a faulty or malicious host-side source, so assess host-to-guest trust boundaries carefully.
Researcher notes
Key uncertainty is product-specific reachability. The CVE describes guest receive-side behavior and host-origin malformed packet conditions, but the bundle does not provide crash impact, privilege outcome, CVSS, or exploitability details. Validate against actual kernel config, module usage, and vendor backport status.
Mitigation direction
Apply vendor kernel updates that include the referenced stable fixes.
Review Debian LTS and Siemens advisories if those environments apply.
Check Linux distribution guidance for fixed package versions and backports.
Prioritize systems using virtio-vsock in shared or less-trusted virtualization environments.
Validation and detection
Inventory Linux guests and record kernel versions.
Identify whether virtio-vsock is enabled or required on those guests.
Compare kernel packages against distribution advisories and stable fix references.
Confirm patched kernels are running after reboot, not only installed.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
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These fields come from the CVE record and ADP containers, not from Glexia's Take. They preserve time-varying source decisions such as CISA SSVC, KEV status, CVSS metrics, and provider references.
0CVSS vectors
3Timeline events
2ADP providers
8Source links
Vulnerability timeline
Timeline events are normalized from CVE metadata, CNA source timelines, ADP timelines, and KEV metadata when present.
CVE reservedCVE Program
The CVE ID was reserved by the assigning CNA.
CVE publishedCVE Program
The CVE record was published.
Sep 5, 2025, 17:21 UTC (UTC+00:00)
CVE updatedCVE Program
The CVE record metadata indicates this as the latest update time.