CVE-2025-21865: gtp: Suppress list corruption splat in gtp_net_exit_batch_rtnl().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gtp: Suppress list corruption splat in gtp_net_exit_batch_rtnl().
Brad Spengler reported the list_del() corruption splat in
gtp_net_exit_batch_rtnl(). [0]
Commit eb28fd76c0a0 ("gtp: Destroy device along with udp socket's netns
dismantle.") added the for_each_netdev() loop in gtp_net_exit_batch_rtnl()
to destroy devices in each netns as done in geneve and ip tunnels.
However, this could trigger ->dellink() twice for the same device during
->exit_batch_rtnl().
Say we have two netns A & B and gtp device B that resides in netns B but
whose UDP socket is in netns A.
1. cleanup_net() processes netns A and then B.
2. gtp_net_exit_batch_rtnl() finds the device B while iterating
netns A's gn->gtp_dev_list and calls ->dellink().
[ device B is not yet unlinked from netns B
as unregister_netdevice_many() has not been called. ]
3. gtp_net_exit_batch_rtnl() finds the device B while iterating
netns B's for_each_netdev() and calls ->dellink().
gtp_dellink() cleans up the device's hash table, unlinks the dev from
gn->gtp_dev_list, and calls unregister_netdevice_queue().
Basically, calling gtp_dellink() multiple times is fine unless
CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST is enabled.
Let's remove for_each_netdev() in gtp_net_exit_batch_rtnl() and
delegate the destruction to default_device_exit_batch() as done
in bareudp.
[0]:
list_del corruption, ffff8880aaa62c00->next (autoslab_size_M_dev_P_net_core_dev_11127_8_1328_8_S_4096_A_64_n_139+0xc00/0x1000 [slab object]) is LIST_POISON1 (ffffffffffffff02) (prev is 0xffffffffffffff04)
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:58!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1804 Comm: kworker/u8:7 Tainted: G T 6.12.13-grsec-full-20250211091339 #1
Tainted: [T]=RANDSTRUCT
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff84947381>] __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x141/0x200 lib/list_debug.c:58
Code: c2 76 91 31 c0 e8 9f b1 f7 fc 0f 0b 4d 89 f0 48 c7 c1 02 ff ff ff 48 89 ea 48 89 ee 48 c7 c7 e0 c2 76 91 31 c0 e8 7f b1 f7 fc <0f> 0b 4d 89 e8 48 c7 c1 04 ff ff ff 48 89 ea 48 89 ee 48 c7 c7 60
RSP: 0018:fffffe8040b4fbd0 EFLAGS: 00010283
RAX: 00000000000000cc RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: ffffffff818c4054
RDX: ffffffff84947381 RSI: ffffffff818d1512 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff8880aaa62c00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbd008169f32
R10: fffffe8040b4f997 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: a1988d84f24943e4
R13: ffffffffffffff02 R14: ffffffffffffff04 R15: ffff8880aaa62c08
RBX: kasan shadow of 0x0
RCX: __wake_up_klogd.part.0+0x74/0xe0 kernel/printk/printk.c:4554
RDX: __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x141/0x200 lib/list_debug.c:58
RSI: vprintk+0x72/0x100 kernel/printk/printk_safe.c:71
RBP: autoslab_size_M_dev_P_net_core_dev_11127_8_1328_8_S_4096_A_64_n_139+0xc00/0x1000 [slab object]
RSP: process kstack fffffe8040b4fbd0+0x7bd0/0x8000 [kworker/u8:7+netns 1804 ]
R09: kasan shadow of process kstack fffffe8040b4f990+0x7990/0x8000 [kworker/u8:7+netns 1804 ]
R10: process kstack fffffe8040b4f997+0x7997/0x8000 [kworker/u8:7+netns 1804 ]
R15: autoslab_size_M_dev_P_net_core_dev_11127_8_1328_8_S_4096_A_64_n_139+0xc08/0x1000 [slab object]
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888116000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000748f5372c000 CR3: 0000000015408000 CR4: 00000000003406f0 shadow CR4: 00000000003406f0
Stack:
0000000000000000 ffffffff8a0c35e7 ffffffff8a0c3603 ffff8880aaa62c00
ffff8880aaa62c00 0000000000000004 ffff88811145311c 0000000000000005
0000000000000001 ffff8880aaa62000 fffffe8040b4fd40 ffffffff8a0c360d
Call Trace:
<TASK>
[<ffffffff8a0c360d>] __list_del_entry_valid include/linux/list.h:131 [inline] fffffe8040b4fc28
[<ffffffff8a0c360d>] __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:248 [inline] fffffe8040b4fc28
[<ffffffff8a0c360d>] list_del include/linux/list.h:262 [inl
---truncated---
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
CVE-2025-21865 is a Linux kernel flaw in GTP network device cleanup. Under specific network namespace teardown conditions, the kernel may process the same device twice and hit list corruption, causing a crash or denial of service. The supplied sources do not show active exploitation.
Executive priority
Treat as a moderate availability risk. It deserves normal kernel patch management priority, elevated for systems where network namespace failures could disrupt production, telecom, or embedded operations. Current sources do not justify emergency incident response based on exploitation.
Technical view
The flaw is in gtp_net_exit_batch_rtnl(). A prior change added netdev iteration that could invoke gtp_dellink() twice for one GTP device when the device and UDP socket belong to different network namespaces. With CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST, this can trigger a list_del corruption BUG during cleanup_net().
Likely exposure
Exposure is most likely on Linux systems running affected kernel versions with GTP networking and network namespaces in use. Systems without the vulnerable kernel code path or not using GTP devices are less likely to be exposed. Downstream vendor exposure should be checked through distribution and product advisories.
Exploitation context
The CVSS vector is local, low complexity, low privileges, no user interaction, and high availability impact. KEV is false, and the provided sources do not cite active exploitation. Evidence supports denial of service, not data theft or integrity compromise.
Researcher notes
The root cause is duplicate device teardown during netns exit_batch handling. The fix removes the for_each_netdev() cleanup path and delegates destruction to default_device_exit_batch(), matching the bareudp pattern. The description notes repeated gtp_dellink() is mainly problematic when CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST is enabled.
Mitigation direction
Update to a kernel version containing the referenced stable fixes.
Check Linux distribution advisories for packaged kernel updates.
Review Debian LTS and relevant vendor advisories for downstream status.
Prioritize systems using GTP devices, containers, or network namespaces.
If patch timing is constrained, check vendor guidance for supported workarounds.
Validation and detection
Inventory Linux kernel versions across affected fleets.
Identify hosts loading or using the Linux GTP networking code.
Check whether container or namespace workflows create GTP devices.
Confirm patched kernel builds include the stable fix commits.
Monitor kernel logs for list corruption, BUG, Oops, or cleanup_net failures.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
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