CVE-2025-10230: Samba: command injection in wins server hook script
A flaw was found in Samba, in the front-end WINS hook handling: NetBIOS names from registration packets are passed to a shell without proper validation or escaping. Unsanitized NetBIOS name data from WINS registration packets are inserted into a shell command and executed by the Samba Active Directory Domain Controller’s wins hook, allowing an unauthenticated network attacker to achieve remote command execution as the Samba process.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
CVE-2025-10230 is a critical Samba flaw where attacker-controlled NetBIOS names can reach a shell through the WINS hook. If an exposed Samba Active Directory Domain Controller uses this hook, an unauthenticated network attacker may run commands as the Samba process.
Executive priority
Prioritize as urgent where Samba AD DCs use WINS hooks or are reachable from untrusted networks. Remote unauthenticated command execution on identity infrastructure can create domain-level business risk. Red Hat-listed products are marked unaffected in the provided bundle.
Technical view
The issue is CWE-78 command injection in Samba front-end WINS hook handling. Unsanitized NetBIOS name data from WINS registration packets is inserted into a shell command. The CVSS 3.1 score is 10.0 with network, low-complexity, no-authentication, no-user-interaction characteristics.
Likely exposure
Likely exposure is limited to Samba Active Directory Domain Controller deployments using the WINS hook and reachable for WINS registration traffic. The bundle marks listed Red Hat products as unaffected, but does not fully define all affected upstream or third-party builds.
Exploitation context
The bundle supports unauthenticated network remote command execution, but KEV is false and no cited source in the bundle confirms active exploitation. Treat exploit status as unconfirmed, not absent.
Researcher notes
Key uncertainty is affected-version scope. The bundle names Samba and WINS hook handling but also lists many entries as defaultStatus unaffected. Avoid broad scanner claims; validate configuration, AD DC role, WINS hook presence, and vendor package advisories.
Mitigation direction
Inventory Samba Active Directory Domain Controllers and identify WINS hook usage.
Check Samba and operating system vendor advisories for fixed packages or documented workarounds.
If vendor guidance permits, disable or remove the WINS hook until remediated.
Restrict WINS/NetBIOS registration exposure to trusted networks where operationally feasible.
Prioritize remediation for domain controllers reachable from untrusted networks.
Validation and detection
Confirm Samba role, version, and whether the host is an Active Directory Domain Controller.
Review configuration for WINS hook settings or related hook scripts.
Check vendor package status against Samba, Red Hat, and distribution advisories.
Verify listed Red Hat platforms are not assumed affected without matching vendor evidence.
Review network paths that can send WINS registration traffic to Samba hosts.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
These mappings and lookup hints may be relevant to the vulnerability behavior, CWE, affected product, or exposure path. Glexia-inferred context is not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, CWE, or CVE Program mapping.
ATT&CK lookup starting points
Use these exact CWE pages and searches to review the Glexia ATT&CK library from this CVE's weakness and description context.
cwe · medium confidence lookup
CWE-78: Command execution behavior lookup
Command injection weaknesses can lead defenders to review execution techniques and command interpreter telemetry. Open the exact CWE lookup page first, then review the ATT&CK searches from that MITRE weakness context. This is a Glexia lookup hint, not an official ATT&CK mapping.
The CVE wording references code or command execution, so execution technique review may help defensive triage. This is a Glexia inferred lookup path, not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, or CVE Program mapping.
The affected technology mentions containers, so container-specific ATT&CK technique review may help. This is a Glexia inferred lookup path, not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, or CVE Program mapping.
These fields come from the CVE record and ADP containers, not from Glexia's Take. They preserve time-varying source decisions such as CISA SSVC, KEV status, CVSS metrics, and provider references.
1CVSS vectors
5Timeline events
2ADP providers
6Source links
SSVC decision data
CISA-ADPCISA Coordinator
Timestamp
Version
2.0.3
Exploitation: pocAutomatable: yesTechnical Impact: total
CVSS vector scores
1 official score
We collect every scored CVSS vector available in the official CNA and ADP containers. When more than one version is present, the table keeps the source vectors side by side instead of collapsing them into the highest score.