CVE-2024-8105: Insecure Platform Key (PK) used in UEFI system firmware signature
A vulnerability exists in UEFI implementations that use a hard-coded software-based Platform Key (PK). An attacker in possession of the corresponding PK private key can sign arbitrary UEFI executables or firmware components, causing them to be trusted by affected systems and potentially bypassing UEFI Secure Boot trust validation.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
CVE-2024-8105 affects UEFI firmware that used a hard-coded Platform Key for Secure Boot. If an attacker has the matching private key, they can make malicious firmware components appear trusted. This can undermine a core boot-time security control, but exploitation requires high privilege and specific key possession.
Executive priority
Treat this as a targeted firmware trust risk, not a broad internet-exposed emergency. Prioritize validation for critical systems because remediation may depend on OEM firmware availability and device lifecycle status.
Technical view
This is CWE-321: use of a hard-coded cryptographic key. Affected UEFI implementations trust a software-based Platform Key whose private key may be known or obtainable. CVSS is 6.4 with local access, high complexity, and high privileges required, but potential confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact is high.
Likely exposure
Exposure is firmware- and model-specific. The source bundle references OEM advisories from Supermicro, Intel, Fujitsu, and Gigabyte. The provided affected-product data is limited and includes entries marked defaultStatus unaffected, so organizations should validate exposure against vendor advisories and firmware inventories.
Exploitation context
Successful abuse requires local access, high privileges, high complexity, and possession of the corresponding PK private key. It could allow signed UEFI executables or firmware components to bypass Secure Boot trust validation. No KEV listing is present, and the provided sources do not state active exploitation.
Researcher notes
Focus on firmware provenance, PK enrollment, and OEM-specific guidance. Avoid assuming every listed vendor product is affected; the supplied affected table is incomplete and partly marked unaffected. Binarly and CERT/CC materials are the primary technical references in this bundle.
Mitigation direction
Check OEM advisories for affected models and firmware-specific remediation.
Apply vendor-provided firmware or Secure Boot key updates where available.
Prioritize servers, shared workstations, and high-value endpoints.
Review vendor end-of-life statements before assuming updates exist.
Restrict administrative access on endpoints pending firmware validation.
Validation and detection
Inventory systems by vendor, model, and firmware version.
Confirm Secure Boot state and enrolled Platform Key details.
Compare firmware and PK indicators against vendor advisories.
Use vendor tools or guidance for definitive exposure confirmation.
Track exceptions where devices are end-of-life or unsupported.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
These mappings and lookup hints may be relevant to the vulnerability behavior, CWE, affected product, or exposure path. Glexia-inferred context is not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, CWE, or CVE Program mapping.
ATT&CK lookup starting points
Use these exact CWE pages and searches to review the Glexia ATT&CK library from this CVE's weakness and description context.
cwe · low confidence lookup
CWE-321: Exact CWE lookup
Use the exact CWE identifier as the starting point before reviewing related ATT&CK behavior. Open the exact CWE lookup page first, then review the ATT&CK searches from that MITRE weakness context. This is a Glexia lookup hint, not an official ATT&CK mapping.
These fields come from the CVE record and ADP containers, not from Glexia's Take. They preserve time-varying source decisions such as CISA SSVC, KEV status, CVSS metrics, and provider references.
1CVSS vectors
3Timeline events
2ADP providers
10Source links
SSVC decision data
CISA-ADPCISA Coordinator
Timestamp
Version
2.0.3
Exploitation: pocAutomatable: noTechnical Impact: total
CVSS vector scores
1 official score
We collect every scored CVSS vector available in the official CNA and ADP containers. When more than one version is present, the table keeps the source vectors side by side instead of collapsing them into the highest score.
CWE links open Glexia weakness intelligence pages with official CWE context, developer remediation guidance, and related CVE mappings.
CWE-321 · source CWE mapping
Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key
Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.