CVE-2024-50268: usb: typec: fix potential out of bounds in ucsi_ccg_update_set_new_cam_cmd()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: fix potential out of bounds in ucsi_ccg_update_set_new_cam_cmd()
The "*cmd" variable can be controlled by the user via debugfs. That means
"new_cam" can be as high as 255 while the size of the uc->updated[] array
is UCSI_MAX_ALTMODES (30).
The call tree is:
ucsi_cmd() // val comes from simple_attr_write_xsigned()
-> ucsi_send_command()
-> ucsi_send_command_common()
-> ucsi_run_command() // calls ucsi->ops->sync_control()
-> ucsi_ccg_sync_control()
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
A low-privileged local user may trigger an out-of-bounds kernel memory access through a debugfs-controlled USB Type-C command. The supplied CVSS assessment indicates possible loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. This is not a remote vulnerability; exposure depends on the affected kernel code, relevant driver path, and debugfs access.
Executive priority
Treat this as a high-priority local privilege-boundary risk, especially on shared Linux systems. Accelerate normal patching rather than declaring a remote emergency: exploitation requires local low-privileged access, and the supplied evidence does not establish active attacks.
Technical view
In ucsi_ccg_update_set_new_cam_cmd(), a user-controlled command value can make new_cam reach 255, while uc->updated contains only 30 entries. The resulting unchecked array access occurs through the UCSI command path. Linux stable commits add the resolution across supported kernel branches.
Likely exposure
Likely exposure is limited to Linux systems containing the vulnerable UCSI CCG code where an untrusted local user can write the relevant debugfs interface. Multi-user endpoints and appliances allowing local shell access warrant closer attention. The supplied version normalization is ambiguous, so package-level vendor confirmation is necessary.
Exploitation context
The CVSS vector describes local, low-complexity exploitation requiring low privileges and no user interaction. The CVE is not listed in KEV, and none of the supplied sources report active exploitation. No conclusion about public proof-of-concept availability can be drawn from this bundle.
Researcher notes
The supplied affected-version data contains duplicated hashes, an isolated “0,” and conflicting affected/default-status presentation. Do not rely on that normalized list alone. Establish applicability using the running distribution package, enabled driver path, vendor advisory, and inclusion of the relevant stable commit or backport.
Mitigation direction
Update to a vendor-supported kernel containing the applicable stable fix or documented backport.
Until patched, restrict untrusted local access and debugfs write permissions where operationally feasible.
Use distribution advisories to map upstream fix commits to packaged kernel versions.
Prioritize exposed multi-user systems using the relevant USB Type-C UCSI CCG driver path.
Validation and detection
Inventory running kernel builds and determine whether the relevant UCSI CCG driver code is present.
Confirm vendor changelogs identify this CVE or the corresponding upstream stable fix.
Review debugfs mounting and permissions for unintended low-privileged write access.
After updating, verify normal USB Type-C and alternate-mode operation.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
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ATT&CK lookup starting points
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cwe · low confidence lookup
CWE-125: Exact CWE lookup
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We collect every scored CVSS vector available in the official CNA and ADP containers. When more than one version is present, the table keeps the source vectors side by side instead of collapsing them into the highest score.