CVE-2024-49394: Mutt: neomutt: in-reply-to email header field it not protected by cryptograpic signing
In mutt and neomutt the In-Reply-To email header field is not protected by cryptographic signing which allows an attacker to reuse an unencrypted but signed email message to impersonate the original sender.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
Mutt and NeoMutt may treat a signed email as trustworthy while an important threading header, In-Reply-To, is not covered by the signature. An attacker could reuse a signed, unencrypted message in a different reply context to appear as the original sender. Business impact is mainly trust and integrity risk in email-driven decisions.
Executive priority
Treat as a targeted integrity risk, not an emergency outage issue. Prioritize if signed email is used for approvals, legal, finance, engineering releases, or executive communications. Patch through normal vendor channels once available.
Technical view
CVE-2024-49394 is a CWE-347 cryptographic verification weakness. The In-Reply-To header is not protected by signing in mutt/neomutt, enabling replay or contextual misuse of a signed unencrypted message. CVSS 3.1 is 5.3, with network attack vector, low complexity, no privileges, and low integrity impact.
Likely exposure
Environments using mutt or NeoMutt for signed email handling are most relevant. Red Hat lists RHEL 8 and RHEL 9 mutt as affected, RHEL 7 as unknown. The source bundle does not provide exact affected version ranges.
Exploitation context
The bundle does not show CISA KEV listing or confirmed active exploitation. The likely abuse case is social or process manipulation: making a legitimate signed message appear related to a different email thread or decision context.
Researcher notes
Evidence is incomplete on exact vulnerable versions and final fixed releases in the provided bundle. Upstream NeoMutt issue and pull-request links indicate active project handling, but remediation details should be verified directly from those sources and vendor advisories.
Mitigation direction
Check Red Hat and upstream NeoMutt guidance for fixed packages or configuration advice.
Prioritize review of RHEL 8 and RHEL 9 systems with mutt installed.
Update mutt/neomutt when vendor-supported fixes are available.
Do not rely on thread context alone to validate signed email intent.
Educate sensitive workflow owners about signed-message replay context risk.
Validation and detection
Inventory systems with mutt or NeoMutt installed.
Compare installed packages against vendor advisories for CVE-2024-49394.
Confirm RHEL 8 and RHEL 9 exposure where mutt is present.
Track the linked Red Hat Bugzilla and NeoMutt GitHub issue or pull requests.
Review processes where signed emails authorize payments, approvals, or account changes.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
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ATT&CK lookup starting points
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cwe · low confidence lookup
CWE-347: Exact CWE lookup
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CWE links open Glexia weakness intelligence pages with official CWE context, developer remediation guidance, and related CVE mappings.
CWE-347 · source CWE mapping
Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.