CVE-2024-47679: vfs: fix race between evice_inodes() and find_inode()&iput()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vfs: fix race between evice_inodes() and find_inode()&iput()
Hi, all
Recently I noticed a bug[1] in btrfs, after digged it into
and I believe it'a race in vfs.
Let's assume there's a inode (ie ino 261) with i_count 1 is
called by iput(), and there's a concurrent thread calling
generic_shutdown_super().
cpu0: cpu1:
iput() // i_count is 1
->spin_lock(inode)
->dec i_count to 0
->iput_final() generic_shutdown_super()
->__inode_add_lru() ->evict_inodes()
// cause some reason[2] ->if (atomic_read(inode->i_count)) continue;
// return before // inode 261 passed the above check
// list_lru_add_obj() // and then schedule out
->spin_unlock()
// note here: the inode 261
// was still at sb list and hash list,
// and I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE was not been set
btrfs_iget()
// after some function calls
->find_inode()
// found the above inode 261
->spin_lock(inode)
// check I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE
// and passed
->__iget()
->spin_unlock(inode) // schedule back
->spin_lock(inode)
// check (I_NEW|I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE) flags,
// passed and set I_FREEING
iput() ->spin_unlock(inode)
->spin_lock(inode) ->evict()
// dec i_count to 0
->iput_final()
->spin_unlock()
->evict()
Now, we have two threads simultaneously evicting
the same inode, which may trigger the BUG(inode->i_state & I_CLEAR)
statement both within clear_inode() and iput().
To fix the bug, recheck the inode->i_count after holding i_lock.
Because in the most scenarios, the first check is valid, and
the overhead of spin_lock() can be reduced.
If there is any misunderstanding, please let me know, thanks.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/000000000000eabe1d0619c48986@google.com/
[2]: The reason might be 1. SB_ACTIVE was removed or 2. mapping_shrinkable()
return false when I reproduced the bug.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
A Linux kernel race can let two threads evict the same filesystem inode simultaneously, potentially crashing the system or corrupting kernel state. Exploitation requires local access and specific timing, but the supplied CVSS assessment indicates potentially severe confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact.
Executive priority
Treat as a high-priority kernel update for shared, multi-user, or locally accessible Linux systems. Schedule remediation through standard emergency or accelerated patching processes, while recognizing that the bundle does not establish active exploitation. Lower-exposure single-purpose systems can follow risk-based maintenance windows after confirming vendor status.
Technical view
The VFS inode lifecycle contains a time-of-check/time-of-use race between inode eviction and find_inode()/iput(). An inode reference count can change after evict_inodes() checks it but before locking, allowing concurrent eviction of the same inode. The upstream fix rechecks i_count while holding i_lock.
Likely exposure
Exposure is limited to Linux systems running affected kernel releases or vendor kernels lacking the referenced fix. The race involves concurrent inode lookup, reference release, and superblock shutdown or eviction activity. Internet reachability alone does not create exposure; the supplied CVSS vector requires local, low-privileged access.
Exploitation context
The bundle reports no CISA KEV listing and supplies no evidence of active exploitation or a public exploit. Triggering the race appears timing-dependent but is rated low complexity in the supplied CVSS vector. Potential impact is high across confidentiality, integrity, and availability, although observed outcomes may include a kernel BUG or crash.
Researcher notes
The affected-version data mixes release numbers and commit identifiers and includes ambiguous entries, so exact distribution exposure cannot be inferred reliably from the bundle alone. Validate vendor backports rather than comparing only upstream version strings. The described failure is double eviction after an unlocked reference-count check; the fix adds a locked recheck.
Mitigation direction
Install a vendor-supported kernel containing the applicable referenced stable fix.
Reboot into the updated kernel after completing normal change-control testing.
Prioritize multi-user systems where untrusted or low-privileged users have local access.
Restrict unnecessary local access until affected systems can be updated.
Validation and detection
Inventory running kernel versions and distribution package revisions across Linux systems.
Map each vendor kernel package to its CVE advisory or referenced stable fix.
Confirm systems booted the updated kernel rather than only installing it.
Review kernel logs for inode-related BUG, clear_inode, or unexpected crash indicators.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
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