CVE-2024-46843: scsi: ufs: core: Remove SCSI host only if added
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: ufs: core: Remove SCSI host only if added
If host tries to remove ufshcd driver from a UFS device it would cause a
kernel panic if ufshcd_async_scan fails during ufshcd_probe_hba before
adding a SCSI host with scsi_add_host and MCQ is enabled since SCSI host
has been defered after MCQ configuration introduced by commit 0cab4023ec7b
("scsi: ufs: core: Defer adding host to SCSI if MCQ is supported").
To guarantee that SCSI host is removed only if it has been added, set the
scsi_host_added flag to true after adding a SCSI host and check whether it
is set or not before removing it.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
This Linux kernel issue can cause a kernel panic in a specific UFS storage driver cleanup path. The practical business concern is availability: affected systems may crash when the driver is removed after a probe failure with MCQ enabled. The source bundle does not show data theft, privilege escalation, or active exploitation.
Executive priority
Treat this as a targeted availability risk rather than a broad enterprise compromise issue. Prioritize patching for devices or fleets that depend on UFS storage and have operational sensitivity to crashes. Broader urgency depends on whether those platforms exist in your environment.
Technical view
CVE-2024-46843 affects the Linux kernel UFS core. If ufshcd_async_scan fails during ufshcd_probe_hba before scsi_add_host runs, later removal can attempt to remove a SCSI host that was never added. The fix tracks scsi_host_added and only removes the SCSI host when that flag is set.
Likely exposure
Exposure is most likely on Linux systems using UFS storage with MCQ enabled, especially mobile or embedded platforms. General Linux hosts without this UFS driver path are less likely to be exposed. The provided affected-version data is incomplete and should be confirmed against vendor kernel packages.
Exploitation context
The bundle states KEV is false and provides no evidence of active exploitation. The described condition is a kernel panic during a narrow driver probe and removal failure path. No public exploit status, remote attack path, or attacker prerequisites are established in the supplied sources.
Researcher notes
The key bug is cleanup state mismatch after deferred SCSI host addition. The fix adds explicit state tracking around scsi_add_host and scsi_remove_host. The source bundle lacks CVSS, CWE, precise version ranges, and exploitability analysis, so assessment confidence is limited to the kernel description and references.
Mitigation direction
Update affected Linux kernels to vendor builds containing the referenced stable fixes.
Check Linux distribution or device-vendor advisories for exact affected package versions.
Prioritize systems using UFS storage with MCQ enabled.
Schedule maintenance windows because kernel updates usually require rebooting.
Avoid inventing local workarounds unless validated by the kernel or device vendor.
Validation and detection
Inventory systems and devices using Linux kernels with UFS storage support.
Confirm whether MCQ is enabled or supported on those platforms.
Compare installed kernel packages against vendor advisories and stable fix commits.
Review crash logs for UFS, ufshcd, SCSI host, or kernel panic entries.
Validate patched kernels in staging before broad rollout.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
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