CVE-2024-38306: btrfs: protect folio::private when attaching extent buffer folios
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: protect folio::private when attaching extent buffer folios
[BUG]
Since v6.8 there are rare kernel crashes reported by various people,
the common factor is bad page status error messages like this:
BUG: Bad page state in process kswapd0 pfn:d6e840
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:000000007512f4f2 index:0x2796c2c7c
pfn:0xd6e840
aops:btree_aops ino:1
flags: 0x17ffffe0000008(uptodate|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x3fffff)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 0017ffffe0000008 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff88826d0be4c0
raw: 00000002796c2c7c 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: non-NULL mapping
[CAUSE]
Commit 09e6cef19c9f ("btrfs: refactor alloc_extent_buffer() to
allocate-then-attach method") changes the sequence when allocating a new
extent buffer.
Previously we always called grab_extent_buffer() under
mapping->i_private_lock, to ensure the safety on modification on
folio::private (which is a pointer to extent buffer for regular
sectorsize).
This can lead to the following race:
Thread A is trying to allocate an extent buffer at bytenr X, with 4
4K pages, meanwhile thread B is trying to release the page at X + 4K
(the second page of the extent buffer at X).
Thread A | Thread B
-----------------------------------+-------------------------------------
| btree_release_folio()
| | This is for the page at X + 4K,
| | Not page X.
| |
alloc_extent_buffer() | |- release_extent_buffer()
|- filemap_add_folio() for the | | |- atomic_dec_and_test(eb->refs)
| page at bytenr X (the first | | |
| page). | | |
| Which returned -EEXIST. | | |
| | | |
|- filemap_lock_folio() | | |
| Returned the first page locked. | | |
| | | |
|- grab_extent_buffer() | | |
| |- atomic_inc_not_zero() | | |
| | Returned false | | |
| |- folio_detach_private() | | |- folio_detach_private() for X
| |- folio_test_private() | | |- folio_test_private()
| Returned true | | | Returned true
|- folio_put() | |- folio_put()
Now there are two puts on the same folio at folio X, leading to refcount
underflow of the folio X, and eventually causing the BUG_ON() on the
page->mapping.
The condition is not that easy to hit:
- The release must be triggered for the middle page of an eb
If the release is on the same first page of an eb, page lock would kick
in and prevent the race.
- folio_detach_private() has a very small race window
It's only between folio_test_private() and folio_clear_private().
That's exactly when mapping->i_private_lock is used to prevent such race,
and commit 09e6cef19c9f ("btrfs: refactor alloc_extent_buffer() to
allocate-then-attach method") screwed that up.
At that time, I thought the page lock would kick in as
filemap_release_folio() also requires the page to be locked, but forgot
the filemap_release_folio() only locks one page, not all pages of an
extent buffer.
[FIX]
Move all the code requiring i_private_lock into
attach_eb_folio_to_filemap(), so that everything is done with proper
lock protection.
Furthermore to prevent future problems, add an extra
lockdep_assert_locked() to ensure we're holding the proper lock.
To reproducer that is able to hit the race (takes a few minutes with
instrumented code inserting delays to alloc_extent_buffer()):
#!/bin/sh
drop_caches () {
while(true); do
echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
echo 1 > /proc/sys/vm/compact_memory
done
}
run_tar () {
while(true); do
for x in `seq 1 80` ; do
tar cf /dev/zero /mnt > /dev/null &
done
wait
done
}
mkfs.btrfs -f -d single -m single
---truncated---
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
This Linux kernel btrfs bug can cause rare kernel crashes when a race corrupts page reference handling. The source describes reliability impact, not confirmed data theft or remote compromise. Business urgency is highest for systems using btrfs on affected kernel lines, especially production hosts where an unexpected kernel crash causes downtime.
Executive priority
Treat as a targeted reliability risk, not a confirmed breach scenario. Patch btrfs systems in normal expedited kernel maintenance, with higher priority for critical workloads where a kernel crash would interrupt service.
Technical view
A btrfs extent-buffer allocation refactor changed locking around folio::private. A race between extent buffer allocation and folio release can double-put the same folio, causing reference count underflow and bad page state crashes. The fix moves lock-sensitive code under i_private_lock and adds a lock assertion.
Likely exposure
Exposure is likely limited to Linux systems running affected kernel versions since 6.8 with btrfs in use. The source metadata lists affected Linux kernel version ranges and kernel stable fixes, but distro-specific package status is not provided.
Exploitation context
The bundle does not cite active exploitation, and KEV status is false. The described trigger is a rare race requiring specific btrfs memory-management timing; the source includes a reproducer concept, but this assessment avoids operational exploit detail.
Researcher notes
Evidence points to a kernel memory-management race introduced by a btrfs refactor in commit 09e6cef19c9f. The public text documents cause and fix, but provides no CVSS, CWE, remote attack path, privilege requirement, or confirmed exploitation.
Mitigation direction
Update affected Linux kernels using vendor or distribution guidance.
Prioritize btrfs production systems where crashes would cause material downtime.
Review kernel stable commits referenced by the CVE for fixed versions.
If immediate patching is blocked, monitor for bad page state crashes.
Avoid inventing workarounds; confirm mitigations with the kernel or distro vendor.
Validation and detection
Inventory Linux hosts using btrfs filesystems.
Identify running kernel versions on those hosts.
Compare versions against vendor advisories and the referenced stable fixes.
Check logs for bad page state messages involving btrfs or btree_aops.
Confirm patched kernels are running after maintenance windows.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
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