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CVE Record

CVE-2024-35944: VMCI: Fix memcpy() run-time warning in dg_dispatch_as_host()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: VMCI: Fix memcpy() run-time warning in dg_dispatch_as_host() Syzkaller hit 'WARNING in dg_dispatch_as_host' bug. memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 56) of single field "&dg_info->msg" at drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_datagram.c:237 (size 24) WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1555 at drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_datagram.c:237 dg_dispatch_as_host+0x88e/0xa60 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_datagram.c:237 Some code commentry, based on my understanding: 544 #define VMCI_DG_SIZE(_dg) (VMCI_DG_HEADERSIZE + (size_t)(_dg)->payload_size) /// This is 24 + payload_size memcpy(&dg_info->msg, dg, dg_size); Destination = dg_info->msg ---> this is a 24 byte structure(struct vmci_datagram) Source = dg --> this is a 24 byte structure (struct vmci_datagram) Size = dg_size = 24 + payload_size {payload_size = 56-24 =32} -- Syzkaller managed to set payload_size to 32. 35 struct delayed_datagram_info { 36 struct datagram_entry *entry; 37 struct work_struct work; 38 bool in_dg_host_queue; 39 /* msg and msg_payload must be together. */ 40 struct vmci_datagram msg; 41 u8 msg_payload[]; 42 }; So those extra bytes of payload are copied into msg_payload[], a run time warning is seen while fuzzing with Syzkaller. One possible way to fix the warning is to split the memcpy() into two parts -- one -- direct assignment of msg and second taking care of payload. Gustavo quoted: "Under FORTIFY_SOURCE we should not copy data across multiple members in a structure."

UnknownCVSS not scoredNot KEV-listedUpdated
Glexia's TakeAutomated analysisunknown

Security readout for executives and security teams

Plain-English summary

CVE-2024-35944 is a Linux kernel VMCI issue found by Syzkaller. The bug produced a FORTIFY_SOURCE memcpy runtime warning when datagram payload bytes were copied across adjacent structure fields. Public sources do not provide CVSS, confirmed exploitation, or business impact details, so urgency depends on kernel exposure and vendor guidance.

Executive priority

Treat this as a kernel maintenance item with uncertain severity. There is no cited active exploitation, but kernel memory-safety fixes should not be ignored. Patch through normal approved kernel update channels, with higher priority for VMware-related or vendor-appliance environments where VMCI is relevant.

Technical view

The issue is in drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_datagram.c, dg_dispatch_as_host(). A memcpy used VMCI_DG_SIZE, including payload bytes, with a destination field sized as struct vmci_datagram. The intended layout placed msg and msg_payload together, but FORTIFY_SOURCE warns against copying across structure members. Stable Linux commits split or correct the copy behavior.

Likely exposure

Exposure is limited to affected Linux kernel versions containing the VMCI datagram code path. The source bundle lists Linux kernels from 3.9 through fixed stable releases as affected, with later fixed versions referenced by kernel stable commits. Exact reachability depends on local kernel configuration and whether VMCI functionality is present or used.

Exploitation context

The bundle cites discovery by Syzkaller and says KEV is false. It does not cite active exploitation, exploit availability, privilege requirements, or a proven impact beyond the runtime warning and kernel memory-safety concern.

Researcher notes

The public record is unusually specific about the code pattern but sparse on exploitability. Avoid overstating impact. Key research questions are reachability of dg_dispatch_as_host(), privilege or guest-host assumptions, and whether the warning maps to a practical memory corruption condition in affected builds.

Mitigation direction

  • Apply the relevant Linux stable kernel update or vendor backport containing the referenced fixes.
  • Use distribution advisories, such as Debian LTS notices, to select supported patched packages.
  • Check Siemens advisories if running affected Siemens products or appliances.
  • Prioritize systems where VMCI-related kernel functionality is enabled or exposed.
  • If no vendor package is available, monitor vendor guidance rather than applying ad hoc changes.

Validation and detection

  • Inventory running kernel versions across servers, workstations, appliances, and VM templates.
  • Check whether deployed kernels include the referenced stable fix or equivalent backport.
  • Review kernel configuration and loaded modules for VMCI-related functionality.
  • Confirm distribution security advisories mark the installed kernel package as fixed.
  • Track any vendor appliance advisories separately from general Linux package status.
Prepared
Confidence
medium
Sources
12

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Potential ATT&CK relevance

Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context

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Vulnerability profileCVE Program record
Severity
Unknown
CVSS
Not scored
Known Exploited
No
Published
Official CVE source material

CNA and ADP enrichment extracted from CVE v5

These fields come from the CVE record and ADP containers, not from Glexia's Take. They preserve time-varying source decisions such as CISA SSVC, KEV status, CVSS metrics, and provider references.

0CVSS vectors
3Timeline events
3ADP providers
13Source links

SSVC decision data

CISA-ADPCISA Coordinator
Timestamp
Version
2.0.3
Exploitation: noneAutomatable: noTechnical Impact: partial

Vulnerability timeline

Timeline events are normalized from CVE metadata, CNA source timelines, ADP timelines, and KEV metadata when present.

  1. CVE reservedCVE Program

    The CVE ID was reserved by the assigning CNA.

  2. CVE publishedCVE Program

    The CVE record was published.

  3. CVE updatedCVE Program

    The CVE record metadata indicates this as the latest update time.

ADP provider summaries

CISA-ADPCISA ADP Vulnrichment
other:ssvc
CVECVE Program Container
siemens-SADPADP container
Affected products

Products and packages named in the record

VendorProductVersion / packageStatus
LinuxLinuxa110b7ebb9c674a2b591af2780dd512ad0198d50, a110b7ebb9c674a2b591af2780dd512ad0198d50, a110b7ebb9c674a2b591af2780dd512ad0198d50, a110b7ebb9c674a2b591af2780dd512ad0198d50, a110b7ebb9c674a2b591af2780dd512ad0198d50, a110b7ebb9c674a2b591af2780dd512ad0198d50, a110b7ebb9c674a2b591af2780dd512ad0198d50, a110b7ebb9c674a2b591af2780dd512ad0198d50unaffected
LinuxLinux3.9, 0, 4.19.312, 5.4.274, 5.10.215, 5.15.155, 6.1.86, 6.6.27, 6.8.6, 6.9affected
Weakness

CWE details

No CWE listed

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