Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
Consensys Discovery before 0.4.5 reused an AES-GCM nonce for an entire session, weakening confidentiality for peer communications. The source says the node private key is not compromised; the exposed material is the session key for a specific peer communication.
Executive priority
Treat this as a targeted cryptographic confidentiality issue, not a broad infrastructure compromise. Prioritize remediation where Consensys Discovery is deployed in internet-reachable or sensitive peer communication paths.
Technical view
The flaw is CWE-323: nonce reuse in AES-GCM. A repeated nonce across messages in one session can break expected confidentiality guarantees for that encrypted exchange. CVSS 3.1 is 5.3, network-accessible, unauthenticated, no user interaction, with low confidentiality impact only.
Likely exposure
Exposure is likely limited to systems that include tech.pegasys.discovery:discovery or Consensys Discovery versions earlier than 0.4.5. The provided affected metadata is sparse, so teams should confirm through dependency manifests, lockfiles, SBOMs, and runtime artifacts.
Exploitation context
The bundle does not cite active exploitation, and KEV is false. The risk is cryptographic confidentiality loss for affected peer sessions, not node private-key theft. No cited source claims integrity or availability impact.
Researcher notes
Do not assume broader product impact from the sparse package metadata. Focus validation on version presence and deployment reachability. The key distinction in the source is session-key exposure for specific peer communication, not compromise of the node private key.
Mitigation direction
- Upgrade Consensys Discovery to version 0.4.5 or later where applicable.
- Check vendor advisory guidance before applying compensating controls.
- Remove unused vulnerable dependency paths from builds and deployments.
- Refresh SBOMs and dependency lockfiles after remediation.
Validation and detection
- Search manifests, lockfiles, and SBOMs for tech.pegasys.discovery:discovery.
- Confirm deployed artifacts do not include versions earlier than 0.4.5.
- Verify transitive dependencies are resolved to a non-affected version.
- Document whether affected peer-discovery functionality is reachable in production.
Public sources used
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
These mappings and lookup hints may be relevant to the vulnerability behavior, CWE, affected product, or exposure path. Glexia-inferred context is not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, CWE, or CVE Program mapping.
ATT&CK lookup starting points
Use these exact CWE pages and searches to review the Glexia ATT&CK library from this CVE's weakness and description context.
CWE-323: Exact CWE lookup
Use the exact CWE identifier as the starting point before reviewing related ATT&CK behavior. Open the exact CWE lookup page first, then review the ATT&CK searches from that MITRE weakness context. This is a Glexia lookup hint, not an official ATT&CK mapping.
Open ATT&CK lookupCVE-2024-23688 mapping review
Open the CVE-to-ATT&CK bridge for reviewed, inferred, or future official mappings tied to this CVE.
Open ATT&CK lookup- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS
- 5.3 (3.1)
- Known Exploited
- No
- Published
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
CNA and ADP enrichment extracted from CVE v5
These fields come from the CVE record and ADP containers, not from Glexia's Take. They preserve time-varying source decisions such as CISA SSVC, KEV status, CVSS metrics, and provider references.
SSVC decision data
CVSS vector scores
1 official scoreWe collect every scored CVSS vector available in the official CNA and ADP containers. When more than one version is present, the table keeps the source vectors side by side instead of collapsing them into the highest score.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N3.91.4CISA-ADPVulnerability scoring details
Base CVSS 3.1 score
5.3MediumVector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Vulnerability timeline
Timeline events are normalized from CVE metadata, CNA source timelines, ADP timelines, and KEV metadata when present.
- CVE reservedCVE Program
The CVE ID was reserved by the assigning CNA.
- CVE publishedCVE Program
The CVE record was published.
- CVE updatedCVE Program
The CVE record metadata indicates this as the latest update time.
ADP provider summaries
Source materials
- CVE List V5 sourceCVE List V5
- https://github.com/ConsenSys/discovery/security/advisories/GHSA-w3hj-wr2q-x83gCVE reference, VulnCheck · vendor-advisory
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w3hj-wr2q-x83gCVE reference, VulnCheck · vendor-advisory
- https://vulncheck.com/advisories/vc-advisory-GHSA-w3hj-wr2q-x83gCVE reference, VulnCheck · third-party-advisory
Products and packages named in the record
CWE details
CWE links open Glexia weakness intelligence pages with official CWE context, developer remediation guidance, and related CVE mappings.
Reusing a Nonce, Key Pair in Encryption
Reusing a Nonce, Key Pair in Encryption represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.