CVE-2023-54167: m68k: mm: Move initrd phys_to_virt handling after paging_init()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
m68k: mm: Move initrd phys_to_virt handling after paging_init()
When booting with an initial ramdisk on platforms where physical memory
does not start at address zero (e.g. on Amiga):
initrd: 0ef0602c - 0f800000
Zone ranges:
DMA [mem 0x0000000008000000-0x000000f7ffffffff]
Normal empty
Movable zone start for each node
Early memory node ranges
node 0: [mem 0x0000000008000000-0x000000000f7fffff]
Initmem setup node 0 [mem 0x0000000008000000-0x000000000f7fffff]
Unable to handle kernel access at virtual address (ptrval)
Oops: 00000000
Modules linked in:
PC: [<00201d3c>] memcmp+0x28/0x56
As phys_to_virt() relies on m68k_memoffset and module_fixup(), it must
not be called before paging_init(). Hence postpone the phys_to_virt
handling for the initial ramdisk until after calling paging_init().
While at it, reduce #ifdef clutter by using IS_ENABLED() instead.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
This is a Linux kernel m68k boot-time bug. On systems such as Amiga where physical memory does not start at zero, booting with an initial ramdisk can trigger a kernel oops. The provided evidence points to availability impact during boot, not remote compromise.
Executive priority
Low for most organizations because exposure is narrow and no exploitation is reported. Prioritize only if the business operates m68k Linux devices where boot reliability matters.
Technical view
The m68k kernel called phys_to_virt() for initrd handling before paging_init(). Because phys_to_virt() depends on m68k_memoffset and module_fixup(), this ordering could fault during early boot on non-zero-based physical memory platforms. Stable commits move initrd phys_to_virt handling after paging_init().
Likely exposure
Exposure appears limited to Linux m68k systems using an initial ramdisk on platforms where physical memory does not begin at address zero. Mainstream x86, Arm, and cloud Linux deployments are not identified as affected in the provided bundle.
Exploitation context
No active exploitation is cited, and KEV is false. The source describes a boot oops condition rather than an attacker-driven exploit path. Evidence is incomplete for CVSS, CWE, or broader security impact.
Researcher notes
The record lacks CVSS, CWE, and detailed affected version boundaries. Analysis should stay tied to m68k initrd boot behavior and the three kernel stable commits. Do not generalize this to all Linux systems.
Mitigation direction
Inventory any Linux m68k systems, especially Amiga-like platforms.
Check whether deployed kernels include the referenced stable fixes.
Update to a vendor kernel containing the initrd handling fix.
If unsupported, request vendor guidance for an appropriate backport.
Treat boot failures as availability incidents on affected devices.
Validation and detection
Confirm the system architecture is m68k before prioritizing remediation.
Check whether boot uses an initial ramdisk.
Review kernel version and applied stable commit history.
Test fixed kernels on representative non-zero physical memory hardware.
Monitor boot logs for early initrd-related oops messages.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
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0CVSS vectors
3Timeline events
0ADP providers
4Source links
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CVE reservedCVE Program
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CVE publishedCVE Program
The CVE record was published.
Dec 30, 2025, 12:08 UTC (UTC+00:00)
CVE updatedCVE Program
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