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CVE Record

CVE-2023-53634: bpf, arm64: Fixed a BTI error on returning to patched function

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, arm64: Fixed a BTI error on returning to patched function When BPF_TRAMP_F_CALL_ORIG is set, BPF trampoline uses BLR to jump back to the instruction next to call site to call the patched function. For BTI-enabled kernel, the instruction next to call site is usually PACIASP, in this case, it's safe to jump back with BLR. But when the call site is not followed by a PACIASP or bti, a BTI exception is triggered. Here is a fault log: Unhandled 64-bit el1h sync exception on CPU0, ESR 0x0000000034000002 -- BTI CPU: 0 PID: 263 Comm: test_progs Tainted: GF Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 40400805 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=-c) pc : bpf_fentry_test1+0xc/0x30 lr : bpf_trampoline_6442573892_0+0x48/0x1000 sp : ffff80000c0c3a50 x29: ffff80000c0c3a90 x28: ffff0000c2e6c080 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000050 x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000ffffcfd2a7f0 x21: 000000000000000a x20: 0000ffffcfd2a7f0 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000ffffcfd2a7f0 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff80000914f5e4 x9 : ffff8000082a1528 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0101010101010101 x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 00000000fffffff2 x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : ffff8001f4b82000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000001 Kernel panic - not syncing: Unhandled exception CPU: 0 PID: 263 Comm: test_progs Tainted: GF Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xec/0x144 show_stack+0x24/0x7c dump_stack_lvl+0x8c/0xb8 dump_stack+0x18/0x34 panic+0x1cc/0x3ec __el0_error_handler_common+0x0/0x130 el1h_64_sync_handler+0x60/0xd0 el1h_64_sync+0x78/0x7c bpf_fentry_test1+0xc/0x30 bpf_fentry_test1+0xc/0x30 bpf_prog_test_run_tracing+0xdc/0x2a0 __sys_bpf+0x438/0x22a0 __arm64_sys_bpf+0x30/0x54 invoke_syscall+0x78/0x110 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x6c/0x1d0 do_el0_svc+0x38/0xe0 el0_svc+0x30/0xd0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x1ac/0x1b0 el0t_64_sync+0x1a0/0x1a4 Kernel Offset: disabled CPU features: 0x0000,00034c24,f994fdab Memory Limit: none And the instruction next to call site of bpf_fentry_test1 is ADD, not PACIASP: <bpf_fentry_test1>: bti c nop nop add w0, w0, #0x1 paciasp For BPF prog, JIT always puts a PACIASP after call site for BTI-enabled kernel, so there is no problem. To fix it, replace BLR with RET to bypass the branch target check.

UnknownCVSS not scoredNot KEV-listedUpdated
Glexia's TakeAutomated analysismoderate

Security readout for executives and security teams

Plain-English summary

This Linux kernel issue affects ARM64 systems where BPF trampoline return handling can violate Branch Target Identification expectations and trigger a kernel panic. The public record describes a crash condition, not data theft or remote compromise. Business urgency depends on whether affected ARM64 kernels run workloads that allow BPF tracing or related BPF program execution.

Executive priority

Treat this as a targeted kernel stability risk rather than a confirmed active breach issue. Prioritize patch validation for ARM64 Linux fleets, especially shared infrastructure or systems where local users, containers, or observability agents can exercise BPF features.

Technical view

On BTI-enabled ARM64 kernels, BPF trampolines with BPF_TRAMP_F_CALL_ORIG used BLR to return near a patched call site. If the next instruction was not PACIASP or BTI, the branch target check raised a BTI exception and panicked the kernel. The fix replaces BLR with RET to bypass that branch target check.

Likely exposure

Exposure appears limited to Linux ARM64 kernels with BTI enabled and the affected BPF trampoline path. The source lists affected Linux kernel versions including 6.0, 6.1.25, 6.2.12, and 6.3, but version mapping should be confirmed against vendor kernel packages and stable commits.

Exploitation context

No KEV listing, public exploitation evidence, exploit code, or remote attack path is provided in the source bundle. The included fault log shows a kernel panic during BPF test execution through the bpf syscall path, indicating a potential local denial-of-service condition where the relevant BPF functionality is reachable.

Researcher notes

The public record is precise about root cause and fix mechanics but incomplete on exploitability, privilege requirements, and distribution package impact. Avoid assuming remote exploitability. Validate against upstream stable commits and downstream vendor backports before declaring exposure or closure.

Mitigation direction

  • Apply Linux stable updates containing the referenced fixes for maintained affected branches.
  • Confirm distribution vendor advisories for exact package versions and backport status.
  • Restrict unnecessary BPF access according to existing security policy until patched.
  • Prioritize ARM64 hosts that run tracing, observability, or eBPF-heavy workloads.

Validation and detection

  • Inventory ARM64 Linux systems and record kernel release plus vendor package version.
  • Check whether deployed kernels include one of the referenced stable commits or vendor backports.
  • Review whether BTI is enabled on affected ARM64 platforms.
  • Assess local BPF access controls and workloads using BPF trampolines or tracing.
Prepared
Confidence
medium
Sources
5

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Potential ATT&CK relevance

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Vulnerability profileCVE Program record
Severity
Unknown
CVSS
Not scored
Known Exploited
No
Published
Official CVE source material

CNA and ADP enrichment extracted from CVE v5

These fields come from the CVE record and ADP containers, not from Glexia's Take. They preserve time-varying source decisions such as CISA SSVC, KEV status, CVSS metrics, and provider references.

0CVSS vectors
3Timeline events
0ADP providers
4Source links

Vulnerability timeline

Timeline events are normalized from CVE metadata, CNA source timelines, ADP timelines, and KEV metadata when present.

  1. CVE reservedCVE Program

    The CVE ID was reserved by the assigning CNA.

  2. CVE publishedCVE Program

    The CVE record was published.

  3. CVE updatedCVE Program

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Affected products

Products and packages named in the record

VendorProductVersion / packageStatus
LinuxLinuxefc9909fdce00a827a37609628223cd45bf95d0b, efc9909fdce00a827a37609628223cd45bf95d0b, efc9909fdce00a827a37609628223cd45bf95d0bunaffected
LinuxLinux6.0, 0, 6.1.25, 6.2.12, 6.3affected
Weakness

CWE details

No CWE listed

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