CVE-2023-53491: start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute
Back during the discussion of
commit a9a3ed1eff36 ("x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try")
we discussed the need for a function attribute to control the omission
of stack protectors on a per-function basis; at the time Clang had
support for no_stack_protector but GCC did not. This was fixed in
gcc-11. Now that the function attribute is available, let's start using
it.
Callers of boot_init_stack_canary need to use this function attribute
unless they're compiled with -fno-stack-protector, otherwise the canary
stored in the stack slot of the caller will differ upon the call to
boot_init_stack_canary. This will lead to a call to __stack_chk_fail()
then panic.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
This Linux kernel issue can cause an early boot panic when stack protector canaries are initialized from code that still has stack protection enabled. The practical concern is availability: affected kernels may fail during boot under certain build conditions. The sources do not show data theft, privilege escalation, or active exploitation.
Executive priority
Handle through normal kernel maintenance unless affected systems use custom kernels or have observed boot instability. Escalate only where critical systems depend on vulnerable kernel builds and cannot be rebooted safely.
Technical view
The fix adds a per-function __no_stack_protector attribute around early kernel startup paths calling boot_init_stack_canary. Without it, the caller's stack canary can differ after initialization, triggering __stack_chk_fail() and a kernel panic. Source severity and CVSS are not provided.
Likely exposure
Exposure is limited to Linux kernels matching the source-listed affected versions and build configurations where this early boot stack protector behavior applies. Distribution backports may change exposure, so version strings alone are not enough.
Exploitation context
The provided bundle says KEV is false and gives no cited evidence of exploitation. This appears to be a reliability and boot-time failure issue, not a documented attacker-driven exploit path.
Researcher notes
The record lacks CVSS, CWE, and detailed affected-version semantics. Analysis should focus on commit inclusion, compiler behavior, and kernel build configuration. Do not assume remote exploitability from the available evidence.
Mitigation direction
Check kernel vendor advisories for CVE-2023-53491 applicability.
Update to a vendor kernel containing the referenced upstream stable fixes.
Prioritize custom-built kernels using stack protector options.
Track distribution backports instead of relying only on upstream version numbers.
Validation and detection
Inventory Linux kernel versions across production and build pipelines.
Identify custom kernel builds and compiler stack protector settings.
Confirm whether vendor kernels include the referenced stable commits.
Review boot panic logs for __stack_chk_fail during early startup.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
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CVE-2023-53491 mapping review
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0CVSS vectors
3Timeline events
0ADP providers
3Source links
Vulnerability timeline
Timeline events are normalized from CVE metadata, CNA source timelines, ADP timelines, and KEV metadata when present.
CVE reservedCVE Program
The CVE ID was reserved by the assigning CNA.
CVE publishedCVE Program
The CVE record was published.
Oct 1, 2025, 11:45 UTC (UTC+00:00)
CVE updatedCVE Program
The CVE record metadata indicates this as the latest update time.