CVE-2023-53487: powerpc/rtas_flash: allow user copy to flash block cache objects
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/rtas_flash: allow user copy to flash block cache objects
With hardened usercopy enabled (CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y), using the
/proc/powerpc/rtas/firmware_update interface to prepare a system
firmware update yields a BUG():
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 2232 Comm: dd Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3+ #2
Hardware name: IBM,8408-E8E POWER8E (raw) 0x4b0201 0xf000004 of:IBM,FW860.50 (SV860_146) hv:phyp pSeries
NIP: c0000000005991d0 LR: c0000000005991cc CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c0000000148c76a0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (6.5.0-rc3+)
MSR: 8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 24002242 XER: 0000000c
CFAR: c0000000001fbd34 IRQMASK: 0
[ ... GPRs omitted ... ]
NIP usercopy_abort+0xa0/0xb0
LR usercopy_abort+0x9c/0xb0
Call Trace:
usercopy_abort+0x9c/0xb0 (unreliable)
__check_heap_object+0x1b4/0x1d0
__check_object_size+0x2d0/0x380
rtas_flash_write+0xe4/0x250
proc_reg_write+0xfc/0x160
vfs_write+0xfc/0x4e0
ksys_write+0x90/0x160
system_call_exception+0x178/0x320
system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4
The blocks of the firmware image are copied directly from user memory
to objects allocated from flash_block_cache, so flash_block_cache must
be created using kmem_cache_create_usercopy() to mark it safe for user
access.
[mpe: Trim and indent oops]
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
This is a Linux kernel defect on PowerPC systems where preparing a firmware update through the RTAS firmware update interface can crash the kernel when hardened usercopy is enabled. The public record describes a kernel BUG, not data theft or remote compromise.
Executive priority
Treat this as a targeted infrastructure stability issue, not a broad internet-facing emergency. Patch during the next suitable maintenance window for affected PowerPC systems, sooner where shared local access or automated firmware workflows exist.
Technical view
The rtas_flash code copied firmware image blocks from user memory into flash_block_cache objects. With CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y, those cache objects were not marked usercopy-safe, causing usercopy_abort and a kernel BUG. The fix creates the cache with kmem_cache_create_usercopy().
Likely exposure
Exposure appears limited to Linux PowerPC/pSeries environments using the /proc/powerpc/rtas/firmware_update path. General x86 Linux fleets are not indicated by the provided sources. Practical risk is highest where local users or maintenance automation can initiate firmware update preparation.
Exploitation context
The source bundle does not show KEV listing, public exploitation, or a CVSS score. The documented impact is a local kernel crash during firmware update preparation, based on the included oops trace and kernel fix description.
Researcher notes
Evidence supports a denial-of-service style kernel BUG tied to hardened usercopy enforcement. The bundle does not provide privilege requirements, CVSS, CWE, or proof of exploitation, so avoid broader impact claims without vendor-specific advisories.
Mitigation direction
Update affected Linux kernels to a release containing the referenced stable fixes.
Prioritize PowerPC or IBM pSeries systems that use RTAS firmware updates.
Check distribution vendor advisories for exact package versions and backports.
Restrict firmware update workflows to trusted administrators where operationally possible.
Validation and detection
Inventory Linux systems running on PowerPC or pSeries hardware.
Check whether CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled on relevant kernels.
Review kernel package versions against vendor backport guidance.
Confirm the applied kernel includes the rtas_flash usercopy-safe cache fix.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
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0CVSS vectors
3Timeline events
0ADP providers
8Source links
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CVE reservedCVE Program
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CVE publishedCVE Program
The CVE record was published.
Oct 1, 2025, 11:42 UTC (UTC+00:00)
CVE updatedCVE Program
The CVE record metadata indicates this as the latest update time.