CVE-2022-49872: net: gso: fix panic on frag_list with mixed head alloc types
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: gso: fix panic on frag_list with mixed head alloc types
Since commit 3dcbdb134f32 ("net: gso: Fix skb_segment splat when
splitting gso_size mangled skb having linear-headed frag_list"), it is
allowed to change gso_size of a GRO packet. However, that commit assumes
that "checking the first list_skb member suffices; i.e if either of the
list_skb members have non head_frag head, then the first one has too".
It turns out this assumption does not hold. We've seen BUG_ON being hit
in skb_segment when skbs on the frag_list had differing head_frag with
the vmxnet3 driver. This happens because __netdev_alloc_skb and
__napi_alloc_skb can return a skb that is page backed or kmalloced
depending on the requested size. As the result, the last small skb in
the GRO packet can be kmalloced.
There are three different locations where this can be fixed:
(1) We could check head_frag in GRO and not allow GROing skbs with
different head_frag. However, that would lead to performance
regression on normal forward paths with unmodified gso_size, where
!head_frag in the last packet is not a problem.
(2) Set a flag in bpf_skb_net_grow and bpf_skb_net_shrink indicating
that NETIF_F_SG is undesirable. That would need to eat a bit in
sk_buff. Furthermore, that flag can be unset when all skbs on the
frag_list are page backed. To retain good performance,
bpf_skb_net_grow/shrink would have to walk the frag_list.
(3) Walk the frag_list in skb_segment when determining whether
NETIF_F_SG should be cleared. This of course slows things down.
This patch implements (3). To limit the performance impact in
skb_segment, the list is walked only for skbs with SKB_GSO_DODGY set
that have gso_size changed. Normal paths thus will not hit it.
We could check only the last skb but since we need to walk the whole
list anyway, let's stay on the safe side.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
This Linux kernel issue can crash a system during specific network packet segmentation handling. The public record describes a kernel panic, not data theft or privilege escalation. Business urgency depends on whether affected kernels are deployed, especially on systems using networking paths like vmxnet3 where the issue was observed.
Executive priority
Treat this as a patch-management availability issue until vendor severity is known. Prioritize production Linux hosts where an unexpected kernel panic would interrupt critical services, especially virtualized network infrastructure.
Technical view
The flaw is in Linux GSO/GRO handling. After gso_size changes, skb_segment assumed checking the first frag_list skb was enough for head_frag state. Mixed page-backed and kmalloc-backed skb heads can hit a BUG_ON. The fix walks frag_list only for SKB_GSO_DODGY packets with changed gso_size.
Likely exposure
Exposure is limited to Linux systems running affected kernel versions or unpatched vendor backports. Systems with heavy virtualized networking, vmxnet3, GRO/GSO, or code paths that alter gso_size deserve closer review. The bundle does not identify affected distributions or appliances.
Exploitation context
No KEV listing and no cited source in the bundle reports active exploitation. The described impact is kernel panic, so practical risk is availability loss. The provided sources do not establish whether a remote attacker can reliably trigger it.
Researcher notes
The evidence is strongest for root cause and fix mechanics, but incomplete for exploitability. The CVE text names vmxnet3 observations and a guarded skb_segment change. It does not provide CVSS, CWE, distribution impact, exploit prerequisites, or active exploitation evidence.
Mitigation direction
Check Linux vendor advisories for CVE-2022-49872 coverage.
Upgrade to a kernel build containing the referenced stable fixes.
Prioritize internet-facing and production virtualized Linux hosts.
Review vmxnet3-heavy environments for patch status first.
Avoid inventing feature workarounds without vendor guidance.
Validation and detection
Inventory running kernel versions across Linux assets.
Map vendor kernel packages to the referenced stable commits.
Check crash logs for skb_segment, BUG_ON, GSO, GRO, or vmxnet3.
Confirm patched source handles mixed frag_list head_frag states.
Record whether each vendor backport includes the fix.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
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CVE reservedCVE Program
The CVE ID was reserved by the assigning CNA.
CVE publishedCVE Program
The CVE record was published.
May 1, 2025, 14:10 UTC (UTC+00:00)
CVE updatedCVE Program
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