CVE-2021-47011: mm: memcontrol: slab: fix obtain a reference to a freeing memcg
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: memcontrol: slab: fix obtain a reference to a freeing memcg
Patch series "Use obj_cgroup APIs to charge kmem pages", v5.
Since Roman's series "The new cgroup slab memory controller" applied.
All slab objects are charged with the new APIs of obj_cgroup. The new
APIs introduce a struct obj_cgroup to charge slab objects. It prevents
long-living objects from pinning the original memory cgroup in the
memory. But there are still some corner objects (e.g. allocations
larger than order-1 page on SLUB) which are not charged with the new
APIs. Those objects (include the pages which are allocated from buddy
allocator directly) are charged as kmem pages which still hold a
reference to the memory cgroup.
E.g. We know that the kernel stack is charged as kmem pages because the
size of the kernel stack can be greater than 2 pages (e.g. 16KB on
x86_64 or arm64). If we create a thread (suppose the thread stack is
charged to memory cgroup A) and then move it from memory cgroup A to
memory cgroup B. Because the kernel stack of the thread hold a
reference to the memory cgroup A. The thread can pin the memory cgroup
A in the memory even if we remove the cgroup A. If we want to see this
scenario by using the following script. We can see that the system has
added 500 dying cgroups (This is not a real world issue, just a script
to show that the large kmallocs are charged as kmem pages which can pin
the memory cgroup in the memory).
#!/bin/bash
cat /proc/cgroups | grep memory
cd /sys/fs/cgroup/memory
echo 1 > memory.move_charge_at_immigrate
for i in range{1..500}
do
mkdir kmem_test
echo $$ > kmem_test/cgroup.procs
sleep 3600 &
echo $$ > cgroup.procs
echo `cat kmem_test/cgroup.procs` > cgroup.procs
rmdir kmem_test
done
cat /proc/cgroups | grep memory
This patchset aims to make those kmem pages to drop the reference to
memory cgroup by using the APIs of obj_cgroup. Finally, we can see that
the number of the dying cgroups will not increase if we run the above test
script.
This patch (of 7):
The rcu_read_lock/unlock only can guarantee that the memcg will not be
freed, but it cannot guarantee the success of css_get (which is in the
refill_stock when cached memcg changed) to memcg.
rcu_read_lock()
memcg = obj_cgroup_memcg(old)
__memcg_kmem_uncharge(memcg)
refill_stock(memcg)
if (stock->cached != memcg)
// css_get can change the ref counter from 0 back to 1.
css_get(&memcg->css)
rcu_read_unlock()
This fix is very like the commit:
eefbfa7fd678 ("mm: memcg/slab: fix use after free in obj_cgroup_charge")
Fix this by holding a reference to the memcg which is passed to the
__memcg_kmem_uncharge() before calling __memcg_kmem_uncharge().
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
This Linux kernel issue is a memory-management bug in cgroup slab accounting. Under specific memory cgroup activity, kernel code could take a reference to a memory cgroup that is already being freed. The source bundle does not provide CVSS, confirmed impact, or exploitation evidence.
Executive priority
Treat this as a kernel maintenance issue with uncertain severity. Prioritize patching where cgroups support containers, workload isolation, or multi-tenant services, but do not escalate as actively exploited based on the provided evidence.
Technical view
The bug is in memcontrol slab/kmem uncharging. RCU protection prevented immediate free, but did not guarantee css_get would succeed when refill_stock changed the cached memcg. The fix holds a memcg reference before __memcg_kmem_uncharge(), avoiding refcount resurrection during teardown.
Likely exposure
Exposure is most relevant to Linux systems using affected kernel builds with memory cgroups enabled, especially container or multi-tenant hosts. Exact distribution package impact must be mapped through vendor kernel advisories.
Exploitation context
The bundle marks KEV as false and cites no public active exploitation. The kernel description includes a stress scenario for dying cgroups, but says that scenario is demonstrative and not a real-world issue.
Researcher notes
The key condition is a memcg lifetime/refcount race around obj_cgroup_memcg() and __memcg_kmem_uncharge(). The supplied data lacks CVSS, CWE, distribution mapping, and exploitability analysis, so impact assessment should remain cautious.
Mitigation direction
Update to a vendor kernel containing the referenced stable fixes.
Check Linux distribution advisories for package-specific affected and fixed versions.
Prioritize container hosts and systems relying on memory cgroups.
Avoid inventing local workarounds; follow vendor kernel guidance.
Validation and detection
Inventory running kernel versions across Linux hosts.
Confirm whether memory cgroups are enabled and used.
Map kernel packages to the cited upstream stable commits.
Verify patched kernels after reboot, not just package installation.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
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ATT&CK lookup starting points
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CVE-2021-47011 mapping review
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