In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/core: Fix unconditional security_locked_down() call
Currently, the lockdown state is queried unconditionally, even though
its result is used only if the PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR bit is set in
attr.sample_type. While that doesn't matter in case of the Lockdown LSM,
it causes trouble with the SELinux's lockdown hook implementation.
SELinux implements the locked_down hook with a check whether the current
task's type has the corresponding "lockdown" class permission
("integrity" or "confidentiality") allowed in the policy. This means
that calling the hook when the access control decision would be ignored
generates a bogus permission check and audit record.
Fix this by checking sample_type first and only calling the hook when
its result would be honored.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
This is a Linux kernel perf issue where SELinux lockdown checks were triggered even when their result would not be used. The documented impact is bogus SELinux permission checks and audit records, not a confirmed system compromise path. No source in the bundle reports active exploitation.
Executive priority
Treat this as a low-priority kernel hygiene item unless audit integrity or SELinux lockdown operations are business-critical. There is no provided evidence of active exploitation or direct data compromise.
Technical view
The perf/core code called security_locked_down() unconditionally, although the result mattered only when attr.sample_type included PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR. With SELinux lockdown hooks, that produced irrelevant lockdown permission decisions and audit records. Stable kernel commits change the order so sample_type is checked first.
Likely exposure
Exposure is limited to Linux systems running affected kernel versions in the bundle, especially environments using SELinux lockdown policy and perf. The source bundle lists Linux 5.4 through 5.13-era versions, including 5.4.117, 5.10.35, 5.11.19, and 5.12.2.
Exploitation context
The bundle marks KEV as false and provides no public exploitation evidence. The described behavior is an erroneous security hook invocation and audit side effect, not a cited remote exploit or privilege escalation technique.
Researcher notes
The key condition is perf event configuration without PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR still causing security_locked_down() to run. Validate through source or vendor patch state, not by developing offensive test cases. Evidence is limited to CVE text and kernel stable references.
Mitigation direction
Upgrade to a Linux kernel containing the referenced stable fix commits.
Check the distribution vendor advisory for backported kernel packages.
Review SELinux lockdown audit noise if affected kernels remain in use.
Prioritize normal kernel maintenance rather than emergency incident response.
Validation and detection
Inventory kernel versions across Linux hosts.
Check whether SELinux lockdown policy is used on those hosts.
Confirm vendor kernel packages include the stable perf/core fix.
Review audit logs for unexpected lockdown permission records tied to perf.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
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CVE-2021-46971 mapping review
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