Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
The Rust syncpool crate before 0.1.6 incorrectly declared a type as safe to send between threads. That can undermine Rust’s normal thread-safety guarantees. Business impact is limited to software that actually depends on this crate and uses the affected type in cross-thread code.
Executive priority
Treat this as a targeted dependency hygiene issue, not a broad emergency. Prioritize confirmation in Rust dependency inventories and upgrade affected projects during normal remediation windows unless the crate is used in high-risk threaded services.
Technical view
Bucket2 in syncpool had an unconditional Send implementation before version 0.1.6. In Rust, generic Send implementations must be constrained by the thread-safety of contained types. This flaw can allow non-Send values to cross thread boundaries, creating memory-safety and undefined-behavior risk.
Likely exposure
Exposure is likely limited to Rust applications or libraries with a direct or transitive dependency on syncpool before 0.1.6, especially code using Bucket2 across threads. The source bundle does not identify affected commercial products or CPEs.
Exploitation context
The source bundle does not report active exploitation, and the CVE is not listed as KEV. No exploit status, exploitability details, or attacker prerequisites are provided, so practical risk depends on application-specific use of the vulnerable crate.
Researcher notes
Evidence is concise and crate-specific. The core issue is an unsound Send implementation for Bucket2. The bundle provides no CVSS, CWE, affected CPEs, exploit evidence, or detailed remediation beyond the fixed-version boundary implied by “before 0.1.6.”
Mitigation direction
- Upgrade syncpool to version 0.1.6 or later where possible.
- Review Cargo.lock for direct or transitive syncpool dependencies.
- Check RustSec advisory RUSTSEC-2020-0142 for vendor-specific guidance.
- Avoid cross-thread use of Bucket2 with non-Send values until remediated.
Validation and detection
- Run dependency auditing against Cargo.lock for RUSTSEC-2020-0142.
- Confirm no syncpool version below 0.1.6 remains in builds.
- Review code paths that use Bucket2 in threaded contexts.
- Document whether syncpool is direct, transitive, or absent.
Public sources used
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
These mappings and lookup hints may be relevant to the vulnerability behavior, CWE, affected product, or exposure path. Glexia-inferred context is not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, CWE, or CVE Program mapping.
ATT&CK lookup starting points
Use these exact CWE pages and searches to review the Glexia ATT&CK library from this CVE's weakness and description context.
CVE-2020-36462 mapping review
Open the CVE-to-ATT&CK bridge for reviewed, inferred, or future official mappings tied to this CVE.
Open ATT&CK lookup- Severity
- Unknown
- CVSS
- Not scored
- Known Exploited
- No
- Published
CNA and ADP enrichment extracted from CVE v5
These fields come from the CVE record and ADP containers, not from Glexia's Take. They preserve time-varying source decisions such as CISA SSVC, KEV status, CVSS metrics, and provider references.
CVSS and timeline data
No CVSS vectors or timeline events were available in the normalized CVE source material.
Source materials
- CVE List V5 sourceCVE List V5
- https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2020-0142.htmlCVE reference · x_refsource_MISC
- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rustsec/advisory-db/main/crates/syncpool/RUSTSEC-2020-0142.mdCVE reference · x_refsource_MISC
Products and packages named in the record
CWE details
CWE links open Glexia weakness intelligence pages with official CWE context, developer remediation guidance, and related CVE mappings.