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CVE Record

CVE-2019-19752: nvOC through 3.2 ships with SSH host keys baked into the installation image, which allows man-in-the-middle...

nvOC through 3.2 ships with SSH host keys baked into the installation image, which allows man-in-the-middle attacks and makes identification of all public IPv4 nodes trivial with Shodan.io. NOTE: as of 2019-12-01, the vendor indicated plans to fix this in the next image build.

CriticalCVSS 9.8Not KEV-listedUpdated
Glexia's TakeAutomated analysiscritical

Security readout for executives and security teams

Plain-English summary

nvOC through 3.2 reused SSH host keys in its installation image. That means many systems could present the same server identity, weakening trust in SSH connections and making internet-exposed rigs easier to find. This is most relevant to cryptocurrency mining environments using nvOC.

Executive priority

Prioritize remediation where nvOC systems are internet-facing or used in environments with valuable wallets, credentials, or management access. The business concern is loss of trusted remote administration and easier discovery of mining infrastructure.

Technical view

This is CWE-321: hard-coded cryptographic keys. Reused SSH host keys let an attacker impersonate affected hosts in man-in-the-middle scenarios and allow fingerprint-based discovery of exposed public IPv4 nodes. The bundle identifies nvOC through 3.2 and does not confirm a released fixed image.

Likely exposure

Exposure is likely limited to nvOC mining rigs through version 3.2, especially systems reachable over public IPv4 with SSH enabled. Organizations without nvOC-based mining systems are unlikely to be affected based on the provided sources.

Exploitation context

The source bundle does not show CISA KEV listing or confirmed active exploitation. The risk is still serious because the issue is remotely relevant, low complexity, and involves SSH identity reuse that can support impersonation and large-scale discovery.

Researcher notes

Evidence is strongest for the hard-coded SSH host key condition and discovery/MITM impact. Product metadata in the bundle is sparse, and the only fix statement says the vendor planned a future image build as of 2019-12-01.

Mitigation direction

  • Inventory any nvOC systems and confirm whether they are version 3.2 or earlier.
  • Regenerate unique SSH host keys on every affected nvOC installation.
  • Restrict SSH exposure to trusted networks or VPN access only.
  • Check vendor release history for an image build that removes baked-in host keys.
  • Treat previously trusted SSH fingerprints from affected hosts as unreliable.

Validation and detection

  • Compare SSH host key fingerprints across owned nvOC hosts for unintended reuse.
  • Verify regenerated host keys remain unique after reboot and configuration management runs.
  • Review firewall and cloud rules for public SSH exposure on mining rigs.
  • Confirm asset inventory contains no unmanaged nvOC installations.
  • Document whether a vendor-fixed image is available before reimaging.
Prepared
Confidence
medium
Sources
4

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Potential ATT&CK relevance

Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context

These mappings and lookup hints may be relevant to the vulnerability behavior, CWE, affected product, or exposure path. Glexia-inferred context is not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, CWE, or CVE Program mapping.

ATT&CK lookup starting points

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cwe · low confidence lookup

CWE-321: Exact CWE lookup

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cve · low confidence lookup

CVE-2019-19752 mapping review

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Vulnerability profileCVE Program record
Severity
Critical
CVSS
9.8 (3.1)
Known Exploited
No
Published

Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Official CVE source material

CNA and ADP enrichment extracted from CVE v5

These fields come from the CVE record and ADP containers, not from Glexia's Take. They preserve time-varying source decisions such as CISA SSVC, KEV status, CVSS metrics, and provider references.

1CVSS vectors
0Timeline events
0ADP providers
3Source links

CVSS vector scores

1 official score

We collect every scored CVSS vector available in the official CNA and ADP containers. When more than one version is present, the table keeps the source vectors side by side instead of collapsing them into the highest score.

ScoreVersionSeverityVectorExploitImpactSource
9.8CVSS 3.1CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H3.95.9Primary CVE score

Vulnerability scoring details

Base CVSS 3.1 score

9.8Critical
CVSS 3.1 vector shape for CVE-2019-19752Attack VectorAttack ComplexityPrivileges RequiredUser InteractionScopeConfidentiality ImpactIntegrity ImpactAvailability Impact

Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack Vector
NetworkAdjacentLocalPhysical
Attack Complexity
LowHigh
Privileges Required
NoneLowHigh
User Interaction
NoneRequired
Scope
ChangedUnchanged
Confidentiality Impact
HighLowNone
Integrity Impact
HighLowNone
Availability Impact
HighLowNone
Affected products

Products and packages named in the record

VendorProductVersion / packageStatus
n/an/an/aListed
Weakness

CWE details

CWE links open Glexia weakness intelligence pages with official CWE context, developer remediation guidance, and related CVE mappings.

CWE-321 · source CWE mapping

Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key

Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.