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CVE Record

CVE-2019-13179: Calamares versions 3.1 through 3.2.10 copies a LUKS encryption keyfile from /crypto_keyfile.bin (mode 0600...

Calamares versions 3.1 through 3.2.10 copies a LUKS encryption keyfile from /crypto_keyfile.bin (mode 0600 owned by root) to /boot within a globally readable initramfs image with insecure permissions, which allows this originally protected file to be read by any user, thereby disclosing decryption keys for LUKS containers created with Full Disk Encryption.

UnknownCVSS not scoredNot KEV-listedUpdated
Glexia's TakeAutomated analysishigh

Security readout for executives and security teams

Plain-English summary

Some Linux installations made with affected Calamares full-disk encryption could accidentally leave the disk decryption key inside a readable boot image. A local user who can read that image may recover the key and decrypt protected LUKS data. This is serious for shared or previously exposed systems, but the bundle does not show active exploitation.

Executive priority

Treat as high priority for shared endpoints, labs, fleets, and any encrypted systems with multiple local users. The issue can turn physical or local read access into disk decryption. Isolated single-user devices still need remediation during normal security maintenance.

Technical view

Calamares 3.1 through 3.2.10 copied /crypto_keyfile.bin, originally root-owned mode 0600, into /boot inside a globally readable initramfs image. That discloses LUKS key material for containers created with full disk encryption. Public sources identify Calamares 3.2.11 and Fedora advisories, but the bundle has no CVSS vector or CWE mapping.

Likely exposure

Exposure is most likely on Linux systems installed with Calamares 3.1 through 3.2.10 using full disk encryption. Risk depends on whether untrusted users could read /boot or obtain the initramfs image, including from backups or support bundles.

Exploitation context

The source bundle does not indicate CISA KEV listing or confirmed active exploitation. Exploitation requires access to the readable initramfs image, not remote code execution. The impact can be high because leaked LUKS key material undermines full-disk encryption assumptions.

Researcher notes

The CVE is narrow: Calamares installer behavior, affected versions 3.1 through 3.2.10, FDE-created LUKS containers, and key disclosure through readable initramfs. Do not generalize to all LUKS systems without installation evidence. Patch and key-rotation details should follow Calamares and distribution advisories.

Mitigation direction

  • Apply vendor package updates for Calamares and distribution advisories.
  • Use Calamares 3.2.11 or later where vendor guidance confirms the fix.
  • Follow vendor instructions to remove exposed key material from boot images.
  • Rotate or recreate affected LUKS key material if exposure is plausible.
  • Review backups and images that may contain the readable initramfs.

Validation and detection

  • Inventory systems installed with Calamares versions 3.1 through 3.2.10.
  • Confirm whether full disk encryption was configured during installation.
  • Inspect vendor advisories for distribution-specific fixed package versions.
  • Check whether /boot initramfs images contain exposed LUKS key material.
  • Verify rebuilt boot images no longer include the exposed keyfile.
Prepared
Confidence
medium
Sources
10

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Potential ATT&CK relevance

Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context

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Vulnerability profileCVE Program record
Severity
Unknown
CVSS
Not scored
Known Exploited
No
Published
Official CVE source material

CNA and ADP enrichment extracted from CVE v5

These fields come from the CVE record and ADP containers, not from Glexia's Take. They preserve time-varying source decisions such as CISA SSVC, KEV status, CVSS metrics, and provider references.

0CVSS vectors
0Timeline events
0ADP providers
9Source links

CVSS and timeline data

No CVSS vectors or timeline events were available in the normalized CVE source material.

Source materials

Affected products

Products and packages named in the record

VendorProductVersion / packageStatus
n/an/an/aListed
Weakness

CWE details

No CWE listed

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