An authenticated OS command injection vulnerability exists in Netgear routers (tested on the DGN2200B model) firmware versions 1.0.0.36 and prior via the pppoe.cgi endpoint. A remote attacker with valid credentials can execute arbitrary commands via crafted input to the pppoe_username parameter. This flaw allows full compromise of the device and may persist across reboots unless configuration is restored.
Security readout for executives and security teams
Plain-English summary
This is a critical flaw in legacy Netgear router firmware. An attacker who already has valid router credentials can make the device run operating-system commands through the PPPoE username field. Successful exploitation can fully compromise the router and may survive reboots through configuration changes.
Executive priority
Treat this as urgent for any legacy Netgear routers still in production. The business risk is device takeover at the network edge, but priority depends on whether affected models exist and whether admin access is exposed or credentials are weak.
Technical view
CVE-2013-10060 is an authenticated OS command injection issue in Netgear DGN2200B firmware 1.0.0.36 and prior, via pppoe.cgi and the pppoe_username parameter. The CVSS 4.0 score is 9.4. Sources identify public exploit references, but not confirmed active exploitation.
Likely exposure
Exposure is most likely in environments still operating Netgear DGN2200B routers on firmware 1.0.0.36 or earlier, especially where administrative access is reachable from untrusted networks. Evidence in the bundle is limited to the named tested model and version range.
Exploitation context
The vulnerability requires valid credentials, so stolen, reused, default, or weak router admin passwords materially increase risk. KEV is false in the supplied data. Public exploit material exists, but the sources provided do not establish active exploitation in the wild.
Researcher notes
The source bundle contains exploit references and a third-party advisory, but does not provide a vendor patch statement or confirmed exploitation evidence. Scope should not be generalized beyond the cited DGN2200B firmware range without additional vendor or advisory evidence.
Mitigation direction
Inventory Netgear DGN2200B devices and identify firmware versions.
Check Netgear or trusted vendor guidance for supported firmware or replacement advice.
Restrict router administration to trusted management networks only.
Change router admin credentials and remove default or shared passwords.
Retire unsupported legacy routers where no supported fix is available.
After suspected compromise, restore a known-good configuration or replace the device.
Validation and detection
Confirm whether any DGN2200B devices run firmware 1.0.0.36 or earlier.
Verify administrative interfaces are not internet-accessible.
Review router configuration for unexpected PPPoE or startup persistence changes.
Check authentication logs for unusual administrative access.
Document whether a vendor-supported update path exists.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Potential ATT&CK relevance
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
These mappings and lookup hints may be relevant to the vulnerability behavior, CWE, affected product, or exposure path. Glexia-inferred context is not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, CWE, or CVE Program mapping.
ATT&CK lookup starting points
Use these exact CWE pages and searches to review the Glexia ATT&CK library from this CVE's weakness and description context.
cwe · medium confidence lookup
CWE-78: Command execution behavior lookup
Command injection weaknesses can lead defenders to review execution techniques and command interpreter telemetry. Open the exact CWE lookup page first, then review the ATT&CK searches from that MITRE weakness context. This is a Glexia lookup hint, not an official ATT&CK mapping.
The CVE wording references code or command execution, so execution technique review may help defensive triage. This is a Glexia inferred lookup path, not an official MITRE, ATT&CK, or CVE Program mapping.
These fields come from the CVE record and ADP containers, not from Glexia's Take. They preserve time-varying source decisions such as CISA SSVC, KEV status, CVSS metrics, and provider references.
1CVSS vectors
3Timeline events
1ADP providers
6Source links
SSVC decision data
CISA-ADPCISA Coordinator
Timestamp
Version
2.0.3
Exploitation: pocAutomatable: yesTechnical Impact: total
CVSS vector scores
1 official score
We collect every scored CVSS vector available in the official CNA and ADP containers. When more than one version is present, the table keeps the source vectors side by side instead of collapsing them into the highest score.