Security readout for executives and security teams
CVE-2005-4900 is a shared identifier for the long-known weakness that SHA-1 is not collision resistant. Where SHA-1 is still used to prove authenticity, attackers may be able to create different content with the same hash and undermine trust decisions. Exposure is most likely in legacy cryptographic uses of SHA-1 for certificates, signatures, trust validation, or protocol compatibility. The CVE bundle lists no specific affected product or version. Treat this as a legacy cryptography risk, not an emergency zero-day. Prioritize removal where SHA-1 affects identity, software integrity, certificates, or external trust relationships. Mitigation focus: Inventory SHA-1 use in certificates, signatures, TLS policy, and application trust decisions.; Follow vendor guidance for disabling SHA-1 where supported.; Migrate legacy dependencies to supported collision-resistant hash algorithms..
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Conservative CVE-to-ATT&CK context
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ATT&CK lookup starting points
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CWE-327: Exact CWE lookup
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Open ATT&CK lookupCVE-2005-4900 mapping review
Open the CVE-to-ATT&CK bridge for reviewed, inferred, or future official mappings tied to this CVE.
Open ATT&CK lookup- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS
- 5.9 (3.1)
- Known Exploited
- No
- Published
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
CNA and ADP enrichment extracted from CVE v5
These fields come from the CVE record and ADP containers, not from Glexia's Take. They preserve time-varying source decisions such as CISA SSVC, KEV status, CVSS metrics, and provider references.
SSVC decision data
CVSS vector scores
1 official scoreWe collect every scored CVSS vector available in the official CNA and ADP containers. When more than one version is present, the table keeps the source vectors side by side instead of collapsing them into the highest score.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N2.23.6CISA-ADPVulnerability scoring details
Base CVSS 3.1 score
5.9MediumVector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Vulnerability timeline
Timeline events are normalized from CVE metadata, CNA source timelines, ADP timelines, and KEV metadata when present.
- CVE reservedCVE Program
The CVE ID was reserved by the assigning CNA.
- CVE publishedCVE Program
The CVE record was published.
- CVE updatedCVE Program
The CVE record metadata indicates this as the latest update time.
ADP provider summaries
Source materials
- CVE List V5 sourceCVE List V5
- https://sites.google.com/site/itstheshappeningCVE reference, mitre · x_refsource_MISC
- https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/08/new_cryptanalyt.htmlCVE reference, mitre · x_refsource_MISC
- https://security.googleblog.com/2017/02/announcing-first-sha1-collision.htmlCVE reference, mitre · x_refsource_MISC
- https://security.googleblog.com/2015/12/an-update-on-sha-1-certificates-in.htmlCVE reference, mitre · x_refsource_MISC
- https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/02/sha1_broken.htmlCVE reference, mitre · x_refsource_MISC
- https://arstechnica.com/security/2017/02/at-deaths-door-for-years-widely-used-sha1-function-is-now-dead/CVE reference, mitre · x_refsource_MISC
- https://kc.mcafee.com/corporate/index?page=content&id=SB10340CVE reference, mitre · x_refsource_CONFIRM
Products and packages named in the record
CWE details
CWE links open Glexia weakness intelligence pages with official CWE context, developer remediation guidance, and related CVE mappings.
Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm represents a recurring weakness pattern that can create exploitable paths when design, validation, or implementation controls are missing.