LiveActive security incident?Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1698: Indirect Prompt Injection

Adversaries may deliver malicious prompts to an LLM indirectly by embedding the prompts in content that the adversary expects may be processed by an LLM.[1] These prompts can be included in web pages,[2] documents, emails, tickets,[3] code, or other sources that an agent, copilot, or other AI system may retrieve and process. When an LLM processes this content, the embedded instructions may cause the system to perform unintended behaviors.[4]

Adversaries may use indirect prompt injection to Impair Autonomous Defenses, and for unauthorized execution of any capabilities available to the LLM.

EnterpriseT1698TechniqueObject v1.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

T1698: Indirect Prompt Injection describes Adversaries may deliver malicious prompts to an LLM indirectly by embedding the prompts in content that the adversary expects may be processed by an LLM.(Citation: NIST indirect prompt injection) These prompts can be included in web pages,(Citation: Palo Alto Indirect Prompt Injection ITW) documents, emails, tickets,(Citation: Snyk Indirect Prompt Injection) code, or other sources that an agent, copilot, or other AI system may retrieve and process. When an LLM processes this content, the embedded instructions may c...

Executive priority

T1698: Indirect Prompt Injection is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate T1698: Indirect Prompt Injection by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (execution), supported platforms (Windows, SaaS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Endpoint process, command-line, and script execution logs
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether T1698: Indirect Prompt Injection appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Indirect Prompt Injection

Adversaries may deliver malicious prompts to an LLM indirectly by embedding the prompts in content that the adversary expects may be processed by an LLM.[1] These prompts can be included in web pages,[2] documents, emails, tickets,[3] code, or other sources that an agent, copilot, or other AI system may retrieve and process. When an LLM processes this content, the embedded instructions may cause the system to perform unintended behaviors.[4]

Adversaries may use indirect prompt injection to Impair Autonomous Defenses, and for unauthorized execution of any capabilities available to the LLM.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
83cc88765197f23d...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.01.0Current bundle83cc88765197…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    NIST indirect prompt injection

    NIST. (n.d.). indirect prompt injection. Retrieved September 18, 2026.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Palo Alto Indirect Prompt Injection ITW

    Beliz Kaleli Shehroze Farooqi Oleksii Starov Nabeel Mohamed. (2026, March 3). Fooling AI Agents: Web-Based Indirect Prompt Injection Observed in the Wild. Retrieved September 18, 2026.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Snyk Indirect Prompt Injection

    Stephen Thoemmes. (2026, February 19). How “Clinejection” Turned an AI Bot into a Supply Chain Attack. Retrieved September 18, 2026.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    GTIG AI Threats Sep 2026

    Google Threat Intelligence Group. (2026, September 8). GTIG AI Threat Tracker: From Prompting to Autonomy – The Evolution of Adversarial AI. Retrieved September 18, 2026.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    mitre-attackT1698
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.