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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1697: Steal Application Specific Passwords

Adversaries may steal Application Specific Passwords (ASPs) to gain access to Valid Accounts, bypassing multifactor authentication (MFA) methods. ASPs are passwords typically used to give third-party applications or legacy devices (which do not support MFA methods) account access.[1][2] An adversary may socially engineer a user into providing an ASP[3][4] (using methods like Phishing for Information), generate an ASP for an already compromised account,[5][6] or obtain an ASP stored on a system. Afterward, adversaries may use the ASP to access Valid Accounts and, in some cases, maintain Persistence, bypassing any form of MFA set on the account.

EnterpriseT1697TechniqueObject v1.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

T1697: Steal Application Specific Passwords describes Adversaries may steal Application Specific Passwords (ASPs) to gain access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), bypassing multifactor authentication (MFA) methods. ASPs are passwords typically used to give third-party applications or legacy devices (which do not support MFA methods) account access.(Citation: Application Specific Passwords)(Citation: Application Specific Passwords Push Sec) An adversary may socially engineer a user into providing an ASP(Citation: UNC6293 ASP Creative Phish...

Executive priority

T1697: Steal Application Specific Passwords is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate T1697: Steal Application Specific Passwords by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (credential-access), supported platforms (Office Suite, Identity Provider, SaaS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Identity, privilege, and authentication events

Detection direction

  • Validate whether T1697: Steal Application Specific Passwords appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Steal Application Specific Passwords

Adversaries may steal Application Specific Passwords (ASPs) to gain access to Valid Accounts, bypassing multifactor authentication (MFA) methods. ASPs are passwords typically used to give third-party applications or legacy devices (which do not support MFA methods) account access.[1][2] An adversary may socially engineer a user into providing an ASP[3][4] (using methods like Phishing for Information), generate an ASP for an already compromised account,[5][6] or obtain an ASP stored on a system. Afterward, adversaries may use the ASP to access Valid Accounts and, in some cases, maintain Persistence, bypassing any form of MFA set on the account.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1044: APT42

APT42 is an Iranian-sponsored threat group that conducts cyber espionage and surveillance.[1] The group primarily focuses on targets in the Middle East region, but has targeted a variety of industries and countries since at least 2015.[1] APT42 starts cyber operations through spearphishing emails and/or the PINEFLOWER Android malware, then monitors and collects information from the compromised systems and devices.[1] Finally, APT42 exfiltrates data using native features and open-source tools.[2]

APT42 activities have been linked to Magic Hound by other commercial vendors. While there are behavior and software overlaps between Magic Hound and APT42, they appear to be distinct entities and are tracked as separate entities by their originating vendor.

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
491ae5220a24838b...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.01.0Current bundle491ae5220a24…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Application Specific Passwords

    Tomer Yahalom. (2024, August 14). App-Specific Passwords: Origins, Functionality, Security Risks and Mitigation. Retrieved September 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Application Specific Passwords Push Sec

    Dan Green. (2025, June 26). App-Specific Password phishing: another novel way to get around passkeys and MFA. Retrieved September 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    UNC6293 ASP Creative Phishing Attack

    Gabby Roncone, Wesley Shields. (2025, June 18). What’s in an ASP? Creative Phishing Attack on Prominent Academics and Critics of Russia. Retrieved September 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Application Specific Passwords Phishing

    John Scott-Railton, Rebekah Brown, Bill Marczak. (2025, June 18). Same Sea, New Phish | Russian Government-Linked Social Engineering Targets App-Specific Passwords. Retrieved September 22, 2026.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Mandiant APT42-untangling

    Rozmann, O., et al. (2024, May 1). Uncharmed: Untangling Iran's APT42 Operations. Retrieved October 9, 2024.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    TAG APT42

    Google Threat Analysis Group. (2024, August 14). Iranian backed group steps up phishing campaigns against Israel, U.S.. Retrieved October 9, 2024.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    mitre-attackT1697
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.