T1694.002: Hardcoded Credentials
Adversaries may leverage credentials that are hardcoded in software or firmware to gain an unauthorized interactive user session to an asset. Examples credentials that may be hardcoded in an asset include:
* Username/Passwords * Cryptographic keys/Certificates * API tokens
Unlike Default Credentials, these credentials are built into the system in a way that they either cannot be changed by the asset owner, or may be infeasible to change because of the impact it would cause to the control system operation. These credentials may be reused across whole product lines or device models and are often not published or known to the owner and operators of the asset.[1][2]
Adversaries may utilize these hardcoded credentials to move throughout the control system environment or provide reliable access for their tools to interact with industrial assets.
Security context for executives and security teams
T1694.002: Hardcoded Credentials describes Adversaries may leverage credentials that are hardcoded in software or firmware to gain an unauthorized interactive user session to an asset. Examples credentials that may be hardcoded in an asset include: * Username/Passwords * Cryptographic keys/Certificates * API tokens Unlike [Default Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0812), these credentials are built into the system in a way that they either cannot be changed by the asset owner, or may be infeasible to change because of the impact it would cau...
Executive priority
T1694.002: Hardcoded Credentials is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1694.002: Hardcoded Credentials by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (persistence, lateral-movement), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Identity, privilege, and authentication events
- Endpoint process, command-line, and script execution logs
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1694.002: Hardcoded Credentials appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Hardcoded Credentials
Adversaries may leverage credentials that are hardcoded in software or firmware to gain an unauthorized interactive user session to an asset. Examples credentials that may be hardcoded in an asset include:
* Username/Passwords * Cryptographic keys/Certificates * API tokens
Unlike Default Credentials, these credentials are built into the system in a way that they either cannot be changed by the asset owner, or may be infeasible to change because of the impact it would cause to the control system operation. These credentials may be reused across whole product lines or device models and are often not published or known to the owner and operators of the asset.[1][2]
Adversaries may utilize these hardcoded credentials to move throughout the control system environment or provide reliable access for their tools to interact with industrial assets.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| ICS | T1694 | Insecure Credentials | This object subtechnique of Insecure Credentials. |
| ICS | T0891 | Hardcoded Credentials | Hardcoded Credentials revoked by this object. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0603: Stuxnet
Stuxnet was the first publicly reported malware to specifically target industrial control systems devices. Stuxnet is a large and complex malware that utilized multiple behaviors, including numerous zero-day vulnerabilities, a sophisticated Windows rootkit, and network infection routines.[1][2][3][4] Stuxnet was discovered in 2010, with some components being used as early as November 2008.[1]
S1045: INCONTROLLER
INCONTROLLER is custom malware that includes multiple modules tailored towards ICS devices and technologies, including Schneider Electric and Omron PLCs as well as OPC UA, Modbus, and CODESYS protocols. INCONTROLLER has the ability to discover specific devices, download logic on the devices, and exploit platform-specific vulnerabilities. As of September 2022, some security researchers assessed INCONTROLLER was developed by CHERNOVITE.[1][2][3][4][5]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | baaa549b6c62… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | baaa549b6c62… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]ICS-ALERT-13-164-01
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2013, October 29). Medical Devices Hard-Coded Passwords. Retrieved April 23, 2026.
Open source URL - [2]OT IceFall
Forescout Vedere Labs. (2022, June). OT: IceFall Report. Retrieved April 23, 2026.
Open source URL - [3]mitre-attackT1694.002Open source URL
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