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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1667: Email Bombing

Adversaries may flood targeted email addresses with an overwhelming volume of messages. This may bury legitimate emails in a flood of spam and disrupt business operations.[1][2]

An adversary may accomplish email bombing by leveraging an automated bot to register a targeted address for e-mail lists that do not validate new signups, such as online newsletters. The result can be a wave of thousands of e-mails that effectively overloads the victim’s inbox.[2][3]

By sending hundreds or thousands of e-mails in quick succession, adversaries may successfully divert attention away from and bury legitimate messages including security alerts, daily business processes like help desk tickets and client correspondence, or ongoing scams.[3] This behavior can also be used as a tool of harassment.[2]

This behavior may be a precursor for Spearphishing Voice. For example, an adversary may email bomb a target and then follow up with a phone call to fraudulently offer assistance. This social engineering may lead to the use of Remote Access Software to steal credentials, deploy ransomware, conduct Financial Theft[1], or engage in other malicious activity.[4]

EnterpriseT1667TechniqueObject v1.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

T1667: Email Bombing describes Adversaries may flood targeted email addresses with an overwhelming volume of messages. This may bury legitimate emails in a flood of spam and disrupt business operations.(Citation: sophos-bombing)(Citation: krebs-email-bombing) An adversary may accomplish email bombing by leveraging an automated bot to register a targeted address for e-mail lists that do not validate new signups, such as online newsletters. The result can be a wave of thousands of e-mails that effectively overloads the victim’s inbox.(Citation: kr...

Executive priority

T1667: Email Bombing is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate T1667: Email Bombing by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (impact), supported platforms (Linux, Office Suite, Windows, macOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether T1667: Email Bombing appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Email Bombing

Adversaries may flood targeted email addresses with an overwhelming volume of messages. This may bury legitimate emails in a flood of spam and disrupt business operations.[1][2]

An adversary may accomplish email bombing by leveraging an automated bot to register a targeted address for e-mail lists that do not validate new signups, such as online newsletters. The result can be a wave of thousands of e-mails that effectively overloads the victim’s inbox.[2][3]

By sending hundreds or thousands of e-mails in quick succession, adversaries may successfully divert attention away from and bury legitimate messages including security alerts, daily business processes like help desk tickets and client correspondence, or ongoing scams.[3] This behavior can also be used as a tool of harassment.[2]

This behavior may be a precursor for Spearphishing Voice. For example, an adversary may email bomb a target and then follow up with a phone call to fraudulently offer assistance. This social engineering may lead to the use of Remote Access Software to steal credentials, deploy ransomware, conduct Financial Theft[1], or engage in other malicious activity.[4]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1046: Storm-1811

Storm-1811 is a financially-motivated entity linked to Black Basta ransomware deployment. Storm-1811 is notable for unique phishing and social engineering mechanisms for initial access, such as overloading victim email inboxes with non-malicious spam to prompt a fake "help desk" interaction leading to the deployment of adversary tools and capabilities.[1][2][3][4]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
0957b8762827a1e2...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundle0957b8762827…
19.11.0Older bundle0957b8762827…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    sophos-bombing

    Mark Parsons, Colin Cowie, Daniel Souter, Hunter Neal, Anthony Bradshaw, Sean Gallagher. (2025, January 21). Sophos MDR tracks two ransomware campaigns using “email bombing,” Microsoft Teams “vishing”. Retrieved January 31, 2025.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    krebs-email-bombing

    Brian Krebs. (2016, August 18). Massive Email Bombs Target .Gov Addresses. Retrieved January 31, 2025.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    hhs-email-bombing

    U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (2024, March 12). Defense and Mitigations from E-mail Bombing. Retrieved January 31, 2025.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    rapid7-email-bombing

    Tyler McGraw, Thomas Elkins, and Evan McCann. (2024, May 10). Ongoing Social Engineering Campaign Linked to Black Basta Ransomware Operators. Retrieved January 31, 2025.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    mitre-attackT1667
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.