T1667: Email Bombing
Adversaries may flood targeted email addresses with an overwhelming volume of messages. This may bury legitimate emails in a flood of spam and disrupt business operations.[1][2]
An adversary may accomplish email bombing by leveraging an automated bot to register a targeted address for e-mail lists that do not validate new signups, such as online newsletters. The result can be a wave of thousands of e-mails that effectively overloads the victim’s inbox.[2][3]
By sending hundreds or thousands of e-mails in quick succession, adversaries may successfully divert attention away from and bury legitimate messages including security alerts, daily business processes like help desk tickets and client correspondence, or ongoing scams.[3] This behavior can also be used as a tool of harassment.[2]
This behavior may be a precursor for Spearphishing Voice. For example, an adversary may email bomb a target and then follow up with a phone call to fraudulently offer assistance. This social engineering may lead to the use of Remote Access Software to steal credentials, deploy ransomware, conduct Financial Theft[1], or engage in other malicious activity.[4]
Security context for executives and security teams
T1667: Email Bombing describes Adversaries may flood targeted email addresses with an overwhelming volume of messages. This may bury legitimate emails in a flood of spam and disrupt business operations.(Citation: sophos-bombing)(Citation: krebs-email-bombing) An adversary may accomplish email bombing by leveraging an automated bot to register a targeted address for e-mail lists that do not validate new signups, such as online newsletters. The result can be a wave of thousands of e-mails that effectively overloads the victim’s inbox.(Citation: kr...
Executive priority
T1667: Email Bombing is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1667: Email Bombing by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (impact), supported platforms (Linux, Office Suite, Windows, macOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1667: Email Bombing appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Email Bombing
Adversaries may flood targeted email addresses with an overwhelming volume of messages. This may bury legitimate emails in a flood of spam and disrupt business operations.[1][2]
An adversary may accomplish email bombing by leveraging an automated bot to register a targeted address for e-mail lists that do not validate new signups, such as online newsletters. The result can be a wave of thousands of e-mails that effectively overloads the victim’s inbox.[2][3]
By sending hundreds or thousands of e-mails in quick succession, adversaries may successfully divert attention away from and bury legitimate messages including security alerts, daily business processes like help desk tickets and client correspondence, or ongoing scams.[3] This behavior can also be used as a tool of harassment.[2]
This behavior may be a precursor for Spearphishing Voice. For example, an adversary may email bomb a target and then follow up with a phone call to fraudulently offer assistance. This social engineering may lead to the use of Remote Access Software to steal credentials, deploy ransomware, conduct Financial Theft[1], or engage in other malicious activity.[4]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Groups, software, and campaigns
G1046: Storm-1811
Storm-1811 is a financially-motivated entity linked to Black Basta ransomware deployment. Storm-1811 is notable for unique phishing and social engineering mechanisms for initial access, such as overloading victim email inboxes with non-malicious spam to prompt a fake "help desk" interaction leading to the deployment of adversary tools and capabilities.[1][2][3][4]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 0957b8762827… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 0957b8762827… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]sophos-bombing
Mark Parsons, Colin Cowie, Daniel Souter, Hunter Neal, Anthony Bradshaw, Sean Gallagher. (2025, January 21). Sophos MDR tracks two ransomware campaigns using “email bombing,” Microsoft Teams “vishing”. Retrieved January 31, 2025.
Open source URL - [2]krebs-email-bombing
Brian Krebs. (2016, August 18). Massive Email Bombs Target .Gov Addresses. Retrieved January 31, 2025.
Open source URL - [3]hhs-email-bombing
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (2024, March 12). Defense and Mitigations from E-mail Bombing. Retrieved January 31, 2025.
Open source URL - [4]rapid7-email-bombing
Tyler McGraw, Thomas Elkins, and Evan McCann. (2024, May 10). Ongoing Social Engineering Campaign Linked to Black Basta Ransomware Operators. Retrieved January 31, 2025.
Open source URL - [5]mitre-attackT1667Open source URL
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