T1588: Obtain Capabilities
Adversaries may buy and/or steal capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than developing their own capabilities in-house, adversaries may purchase, freely download, or steal them. Activities may include the acquisition of malware, software (including licenses), exploits, certificates, and information relating to vulnerabilities. Adversaries may obtain capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle.
In addition to downloading free malware, software, and exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware and exploits, criminal marketplaces, or from individuals.[1][2]
In addition to purchasing capabilities, adversaries may steal capabilities from third-party entities (including other adversaries). This can include stealing software licenses, malware, SSL/TLS and code-signing certificates, or raiding closed databases of vulnerabilities or exploits.[3]
Security context for executives and security teams
T1588: Obtain Capabilities describes Adversaries may buy and/or steal capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than developing their own capabilities in-house, adversaries may purchase, freely download, or steal them. Activities may include the acquisition of malware, software (including licenses), exploits, certificates, and information relating to vulnerabilities. Adversaries may obtain capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle. In addition to downloading free malware, software, and ...
Executive priority
T1588: Obtain Capabilities is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1588: Obtain Capabilities by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (resource-development), supported platforms (PRE), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1588: Obtain Capabilities appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Obtain Capabilities
Adversaries may buy and/or steal capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than developing their own capabilities in-house, adversaries may purchase, freely download, or steal them. Activities may include the acquisition of malware, software (including licenses), exploits, certificates, and information relating to vulnerabilities. Adversaries may obtain capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle.
In addition to downloading free malware, software, and exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware and exploits, criminal marketplaces, or from individuals.[1][2]
In addition to purchasing capabilities, adversaries may steal capabilities from third-party entities (including other adversaries). This can include stealing software licenses, malware, SSL/TLS and code-signing certificates, or raiding closed databases of vulnerabilities or exploits.[3]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1588.007 | Artificial IntelligenceSub-technique | Artificial Intelligence subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1588.004 | Digital CertificatesSub-technique | Digital Certificates subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1588.006 | VulnerabilitiesSub-technique | Vulnerabilities subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1588.001 | MalwareSub-technique | Malware subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1588.002 | ToolSub-technique | Tool subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1588.003 | Code Signing CertificatesSub-technique | Code Signing Certificates subtechnique of this object. |
| Enterprise | T1588.005 | ExploitsSub-technique | Exploits subtechnique of this object. |
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | f89dbfee2b82… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | f89dbfee2b82… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]NationsBuying
Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger. (2013, July 12). Nations Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code. Retrieved March 9, 2017.
Open source URL - [2]PegasusCitizenLab
Bill Marczak and John Scott-Railton. (2016, August 24). The Million Dollar Dissident: NSO Group’s iPhone Zero-Days used against a UAE Human Rights Defender. Retrieved December 12, 2016.
Open source URL - [3]DiginotarCompromise
Fisher, D. (2012, October 31). Final Report on DigiNotar Hack Shows Total Compromise of CA Servers. Retrieved March 6, 2017.
Open source URL - [4]Analyzing CS Dec 2020
Maynier, E. (2020, December 20). Analyzing Cobalt Strike for Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
Open source URL - [5]FireEyeSupplyChain
FireEye. (2014). SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: From Quartermaster to SunshopFireEye. Retrieved March 6, 2017.
Open source URL - [6]Recorded Future Beacon Certificates
Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved September 16, 2024.
Open source URL - [7]Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017
Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.
Open source URL - [8]mitre-attackT1588Open source URL
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