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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1415: URL Scheme Hijacking

An iOS application may be able to maliciously claim a URL scheme, allowing it to intercept calls that are meant for a different application[1][2]. This technique, for example, could be used to capture OAuth authorization codes[3] or to phish user credentials[4].

MobileT1415TechniqueObject v1.1Modified
Historical object

This ATT&CK object is revoked or deprecated in the current MITRE ATT&CK release.

It remains available for historical context and inbound links. Use current ATT&CK relationships and replacement guidance before basing detection or reporting work on this page.

Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

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Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

URL Scheme Hijacking

An iOS application may be able to maliciously claim a URL scheme, allowing it to intercept calls that are meant for a different application[1][2]. This technique, for example, could be used to capture OAuth authorization codes[3] or to phish user credentials[4].

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

1 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
MobileT1635.001URI HijackingSub-techniqueThis object revoked by URI Hijacking.
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
a552f0d495ddbdd3...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.1Current bundleRevokeda552f0d495dd…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    FireEye-Masque2

    Hui Xue, Tao Wei, Yulong Zhang, Song Jin, Zhaofeng Chen. (2015, February 19). IOS MASQUE ATTACK REVIVED: BYPASSING PROMPT FOR TRUST AND APP URL SCHEME HIJACKING. Retrieved December 21, 2016.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Dhanjani-URLScheme

    Nitesh Dhanjani. (2010, November 8). Insecure Handling of URL Schemes in Apple’s iOS. Retrieved December 21, 2016.

  3. [3]
    IETF-PKCE

    N. Sakimura, J. Bradley, and N. Agarwal. (2015, September). IETF RFC 7636: Proof Key for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients. Retrieved December 21, 2016.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    MobileIron-XARA

    Michael T. Raggo. (2015, October 1). iOS URL Scheme Hijacking (XARA) Attack Analysis and Countermeasures. Retrieved December 21, 2016.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Dhanjani-URLScheme

    Nitesh Dhanjani. (2010, November 8). Insecure Handling of URL Schemes in Apple’s iOS. Retrieved December 21, 2016.

  6. [6]
    FireEye-Masque2

    Hui Xue, Tao Wei, Yulong Zhang, Song Jin, Zhaofeng Chen. (2015, February 19). IOS MASQUE ATTACK REVIVED: BYPASSING PROMPT FOR TRUST AND APP URL SCHEME HIJACKING. Retrieved December 21, 2016.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    IETF-PKCE

    N. Sakimura, J. Bradley, and N. Agarwal. (2015, September). IETF RFC 7636: Proof Key for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients. Retrieved December 21, 2016.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    MobileIron-XARA

    Michael T. Raggo. (2015, October 1). iOS URL Scheme Hijacking (XARA) Attack Analysis and Countermeasures. Retrieved December 21, 2016.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    NIST Mobile Threat CatalogueAUT-10
    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    NIST Mobile Threat CatalogueAUT-10
    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    mitre-attackT1415
    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    mitre-attackT1415
    Open source URL
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