T1414: Clipboard Data
Adversaries may abuse clipboard manager APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard. For example, passwords being copied and pasted from a password manager application could be captured by a malicious application installed on the device.[1]
On Android, applications can use the `ClipboardManager.OnPrimaryClipChangedListener()` API to register as a listener and monitor the clipboard for changes. However, starting in Android 10, this can only be used if the application is in the foreground, or is set as the device’s default input method editor (IME).[2][3]
On iOS, this can be accomplished by accessing the `UIPasteboard.general.string` field. However, starting in iOS 14, upon accessing the clipboard, the user will be shown a system notification if the accessed text originated in a different application. For example, if the user copies the text of an iMessage from the Messages application, the notification will read “application_name has pasted from Messages” when the text was pasted in a different application.[4]
Security context for executives and security teams
T1414: Clipboard Data describes Adversaries may abuse clipboard manager APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard. For example, passwords being copied and pasted from a password manager application could be captured by a malicious application installed on the device.(Citation: Fahl-Clipboard) On Android, applications can use the `ClipboardManager.OnPrimaryClipChangedListener()` API to register as a listener and monitor the clipboard for changes. However, starting in Android 10, this can only be used if the application is...
Executive priority
T1414: Clipboard Data is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1414: Clipboard Data by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (collection, credential-access), supported platforms (Android, iOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Identity, privilege, and authentication events
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1414: Clipboard Data appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Clipboard Data
Adversaries may abuse clipboard manager APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard. For example, passwords being copied and pasted from a password manager application could be captured by a malicious application installed on the device.[1]
On Android, applications can use the `ClipboardManager.OnPrimaryClipChangedListener()` API to register as a listener and monitor the clipboard for changes. However, starting in Android 10, this can only be used if the application is in the foreground, or is set as the device’s default input method editor (IME).[2][3]
On iOS, this can be accomplished by accessing the `UIPasteboard.general.string` field. However, starting in iOS 14, upon accessing the clipboard, the user will be shown a system notification if the accessed text originated in a different application. For example, if the user copies the text of an iMessage from the Messages application, the notification will read “application_name has pasted from Messages” when the text was pasted in a different application.[4]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0295: RCSAndroid
RCSAndroid is Android malware. [1]
S1241: RatMilad
RatMilad is an Android remote access tool (RAT) with spyware functionality that has been used to target enterprise mobile devices in the Middle East since at least 2021. Variants of RatMilad have been disguised as VPN applications and a fake app named NumRent. Upon installation, RatMilad employs multiple Collection techniques to collect sensitive information before uploading the collected data to its command and control (C2) server. [1]
S1079: BOULDSPY
S0421: GolfSpy
GolfSpy is Android spyware deployed by the group Bouncing Golf.[1]
S0297: XcodeGhost
XcodeGhost is iOS malware that infected at least 39 iOS apps in 2015 and potentially affected millions of users. [1] [2]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 3.1 | Current bundle | ee7e66239215… | ||
| 19.1 | 3.1 | Older bundle | ee7e66239215… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Fahl-Clipboard
Fahl, S, et al.. (2013). Hey, You, Get Off of My Clipboard. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]Github Capture Clipboard 2019
Pearce, G. (, January). Retrieved August 8, 2019.
Open source URL - [3]Android 10 Privacy Changes
Android Developers. (n.d.). Privacy changes in Android 10. Retrieved September 11, 2019.
Open source URL - [4]UIPPasteboard
Apple Developer. (n.d.). UIPasteboard. Retrieved April 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [5]NIST Mobile Threat CatalogueAPP-35Open source URL
- [6]mitre-attackT1414Open source URL
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