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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1084: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription

Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. Adversaries may attempt to evade detection of this technique by compiling WMI scripts into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension). [1] Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time or the computer's uptime. [2] Several threat groups have reportedly used this technique to maintain persistence. [3]

EnterpriseT1084TechniqueObject v1.2Modified
Historical object

This ATT&CK object is revoked or deprecated in the current MITRE ATT&CK release.

It remains available for historical context and inbound links. Use current ATT&CK relationships and replacement guidance before basing detection or reporting work on this page.

Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

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Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription

Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. Adversaries may attempt to evade detection of this technique by compiling WMI scripts into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension). [1] Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time or the computer's uptime. [2] Several threat groups have reportedly used this technique to maintain persistence. [3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

1 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1546.003Windows Management Instrumentation Event SubscriptionSub-techniqueThis object revoked by Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription.
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
6fc543c60a9581c7...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.2Current bundleRevoked6fc543c60a95…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Dell WMI Persistence

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) Research Team. (2016, March 28). A Novel WMI Persistence Implementation. Retrieved March 30, 2016.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Kazanciyan 2014

    Kazanciyan, R. & Hastings, M. (2014). Defcon 22 Presentation. Investigating PowerShell Attacks [slides]. Retrieved November 3, 2014.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Mandiant M-Trends 2015

    Mandiant. (2015, February 24). M-Trends 2015: A View from the Front Lines. Retrieved May 18, 2016.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Dell WMI Persistence

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) Research Team. (2016, March 28). A Novel WMI Persistence Implementation. Retrieved March 30, 2016.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Dell WMI Persistence

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) Research Team. (2016, March 28). A Novel WMI Persistence Implementation. Retrieved March 30, 2016.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Kazanciyan 2014

    Kazanciyan, R. & Hastings, M. (2014). Defcon 22 Presentation. Investigating PowerShell Attacks [slides]. Retrieved November 3, 2014.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    Kazanciyan 2014

    Kazanciyan, R. & Hastings, M. (2014). Defcon 22 Presentation. Investigating PowerShell Attacks [slides]. Retrieved November 3, 2014.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    Mandiant M-Trends 2015

    Mandiant. (2015, February 24). M-Trends 2015: A View from the Front Lines. Retrieved May 18, 2016.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    Mandiant M-Trends 2015

    Mandiant. (2015, February 24). M-Trends 2015: A View from the Front Lines. Retrieved May 18, 2016.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    Medium Detecting WMI Persistence

    French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    Medium Detecting WMI Persistence

    French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    Medium Detecting WMI Persistence

    French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    TechNet Autoruns

    Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    TechNet Autoruns

    Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    TechNet Autoruns

    Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    mitre-attackT1084
    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    mitre-attackT1084
    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    mitre-attackT1084
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

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