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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1038: DLL Search Order Hijacking

Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. [1] Adversaries may take advantage of the Windows DLL search order and programs that ambiguously specify DLLs to gain privilege escalation and persistence.

Adversaries may perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks, [2] by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program. Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. [3] Adversaries may use this behavior to cause the program to load a malicious DLL.

Adversaries may also directly modify the way a program loads DLLs by replacing an existing DLL or modifying a .manifest or .local redirection file, directory, or junction to cause the program to load a different DLL to maintain persistence or privilege escalation. [4] [5] [6]

If a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program.

Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.

EnterpriseT1038TechniqueObject v1.1Modified
Historical object

This ATT&CK object is revoked or deprecated in the current MITRE ATT&CK release.

It remains available for historical context and inbound links. Use current ATT&CK relationships and replacement guidance before basing detection or reporting work on this page.

Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

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Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

DLL Search Order Hijacking

Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. [1] Adversaries may take advantage of the Windows DLL search order and programs that ambiguously specify DLLs to gain privilege escalation and persistence.

Adversaries may perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks, [2] by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program. Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. [3] Adversaries may use this behavior to cause the program to load a malicious DLL.

Adversaries may also directly modify the way a program loads DLLs by replacing an existing DLL or modifying a .manifest or .local redirection file, directory, or junction to cause the program to load a different DLL to maintain persistence or privilege escalation. [4] [5] [6]

If a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program.

Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

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Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

1 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1574.001DLLSub-techniqueThis object revoked by DLL.
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
ea7b6fe43c3e5c46...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.1Current bundleRevokedea7b6fe43c3e…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Microsoft DLL Search

    Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Search Order. Retrieved November 30, 2014.

  2. [2]
    OWASP Binary Planting

    OWASP. (2013, January 30). Binary planting. Retrieved June 7, 2016.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Microsoft 2269637

    Microsoft. (2010, August 22). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637 Released. Retrieved December 5, 2014.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Microsoft DLL Redirection

    Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Redirection. Retrieved December 5, 2014.

  5. [5]
    Microsoft Manifests

    Microsoft. (n.d.). Manifests. Retrieved December 5, 2014.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Mandiant Search Order

    Mandiant. (2010, August 31). DLL Search Order Hijacking Revisited. Retrieved December 5, 2014.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    Mandiant Search Order

    Mandiant. (2010, August 31). DLL Search Order Hijacking Revisited. Retrieved December 5, 2014.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    Mandiant Search Order

    Mandiant. (2010, August 31). DLL Search Order Hijacking Revisited. Retrieved December 5, 2014.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    Microsoft 2269637

    Microsoft. (2010, August 22). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637 Released. Retrieved December 5, 2014.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    Microsoft 2269637

    Microsoft. (2010, August 22). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637 Released. Retrieved December 5, 2014.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    Microsoft DLL Redirection

    Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Redirection. Retrieved December 5, 2014.

  12. [12]
    Microsoft DLL Redirection

    Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Redirection. Retrieved December 5, 2014.

  13. [13]
    Microsoft DLL Search

    Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Search Order. Retrieved November 30, 2014.

  14. [14]
    Microsoft DLL Search

    Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Search Order. Retrieved November 30, 2014.

  15. [15]
    Microsoft Manifests

    Microsoft. (n.d.). Manifests. Retrieved December 5, 2014.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    Microsoft Manifests

    Microsoft. (n.d.). Manifests. Retrieved December 5, 2014.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    OWASP Binary Planting

    OWASP. (2013, January 30). Binary planting. Retrieved June 7, 2016.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    OWASP Binary Planting

    OWASP. (2013, January 30). Binary planting. Retrieved June 7, 2016.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    capecCAPEC-471
    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    capecCAPEC-471
    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    capecCAPEC-471
    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    mitre-attackT1038
    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    mitre-attackT1038
    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    mitre-attackT1038
    Open source URL
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