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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0268: Bisonal

MITRE ATT&CK S0268: Bisonal Malware details for Windows, with detection guidance, relationships and mapped CVEs.

EnterpriseS0268MalwareObject v2.1Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0268: Bisonal describes [Bisonal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268) is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by [Tonto Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0131) against public and private sector organizations in Russia, South Korea, and Japan since at least December 2010.(Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018)(Citation: Talos Bisonal Mar 2020)

Executive priority

S0268: Bisonal is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0268: Bisonal by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0268: Bisonal appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Bisonal

No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

34 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1106Native APIThis object uses Native API.
EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-techniqueThis object uses File Deletion.
EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-techniqueThis object uses Symmetric Cryptography.
EnterpriseT1057Process DiscoveryThis object uses Process Discovery.
EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool TransferThis object uses Ingress Tool Transfer.
EnterpriseT1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionThis object uses Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion.
EnterpriseT1543.003Windows ServiceSub-techniqueThis object uses Windows Service.
EnterpriseT1137.006Add-insSub-techniqueThis object uses Add-ins.
EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-techniqueThis object uses Visual Basic.
EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationThis object uses Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information.
EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-techniqueThis object uses Encrypted/Encoded File.
EnterpriseT1083File and Directory DiscoveryThis object uses File and Directory Discovery.
EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-techniqueThis object uses Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder.
EnterpriseT1005Data from Local SystemThis object uses Data from Local System.
EnterpriseT1497.003Time Based ChecksSub-techniqueThis object uses Time Based Checks.
EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-techniqueThis object uses Web Protocols.
EnterpriseT1112Modify RegistryThis object uses Modify Registry.
EnterpriseT1218.011Rundll32Sub-techniqueThis object uses Rundll32.
EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-techniqueThis object uses Malicious File.
EnterpriseT1027.001Binary PaddingSub-techniqueThis object uses Binary Padding.
EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-techniqueThis object uses Spearphishing Attachment.
EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-techniqueThis object uses Standard Encoding.
EnterpriseT1012Query RegistryThis object uses Query Registry.
EnterpriseT1027.002Software PackingSub-techniqueThis object uses Software Packing.
EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelThis object uses Exfiltration Over C2 Channel.
EnterpriseT1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolThis object uses Non-Application Layer Protocol.
EnterpriseT1090ProxyThis object uses Proxy.
EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-techniqueThis object uses Windows Command Shell.
EnterpriseT1082System Information DiscoveryThis object uses System Information Discovery.
EnterpriseT1568Dynamic ResolutionThis object uses Dynamic Resolution.
EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryThis object uses System Network Configuration Discovery.
EnterpriseT1124System Time DiscoveryThis object uses System Time Discovery.
EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-techniqueThis object uses Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location.
EnterpriseT1036MasqueradingThis object uses Masquerading.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0131: Tonto Team

Tonto Team is a suspected Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage threat group that has primarily targeted South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the United States since at least 2009; by 2020 they expanded operations to include other Asian as well as Eastern European countries. Tonto Team has targeted government, military, energy, mining, financial, education, healthcare, and technology organizations, including through the Heartbeat Campaign (2009-2012) and Operation Bitter Biscuit (2017).[1][2][3][4][5][6]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0131: Tonto TeamEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.001: Symmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1497: Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1543.003: Windows ServiceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1137.006: Add-insEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.005: Visual BasicEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1005: Data from Local SystemEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1497.003: Time Based ChecksEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1112: Modify RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1218.011: Rundll32Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.002: Malicious FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.001: Binary PaddingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.001: Spearphishing AttachmentEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1132.001: Standard EncodingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1012: Query RegistryEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
2.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
fa0ae1983029161c...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.22.1Current bundlefa0ae1983029…
19.12.1Older bundlefa0ae1983029…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018

    Hayashi, K., Ray, V. (2018, July 31). Bisonal Malware Used in Attacks Against Russia and South Korea. Retrieved August 7, 2018.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Talos Bisonal Mar 2020

    Mercer, W., et al. (2020, March 5). Bisonal: 10 years of play. Retrieved January 26, 2022.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Bisonal

    (Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018)(Citation: Talos Bisonal Mar 2020)

  4. [4]
    mitre-attackS0268
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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