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MITRE ATT&CK® Mitigation

M0938: Execution Prevention

Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.

ICSM0938MitigationObject v1.1Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

M0938: Execution Prevention describes Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.

Executive priority

M0938: Execution Prevention is an official MITRE ATT&CK mitigation. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate M0938: Execution Prevention by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether M0938: Execution Prevention appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Execution Prevention

Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

12 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
ICST0863User Execution

Application control may be able to prevent the running of executables masquerading as other files.

ICST1701.004Visual BasicSub-technique

Use application control and macro/script restrictions to prevent unapproved VBS/VBA/VBScript execution, while explicitly allowlisting required vendor macros and engineering automation.

ICST1701.003Unix ShellSub-technique

Restrict interactive and scripted shell execution on Linux, network, and embedded ICS assets to approved accounts, management paths, commands, and vendor workflows. Where full application control is unavailable, constrain SSH/Telnet access and privileged shell use to dedicated administration paths.

ICST1701.001PowerShellSub-technique

Use application control/allowlisting to restrict PowerShell hosts, script paths, interpreters, and child-process behavior to approved engineering and operational workflows. Prefer explicit allowlists over broad blocking on production OT systems.

ICST0894System Binary Proxy Execution

Disallow the execution of applications/programs which are not required for normal system functions, including any specific command-line arguments which may allow the execution of proxy commands or application binaries.

ICST0871Execution through API

Minimize the exposure of API calls that allow the execution of code.

ICST0834Native API

Minimize the exposure of API calls that allow the execution of code.

ICST1701.006JavaScriptSub-technique

Use application control to restrict wscript.exe, cscript.exe, mshta.exe, Node.js, and other JavaScript runtimes to approved paths, parent processes, scripts, and users.

ICST1701Command and Scripting Interpreter

Execution prevention may block malicious software from accessing protected resources through the command-line interface.

ICST1701.002Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Restrict cmd.exe, batch files, and command-shell child processes to approved binaries, paths, parent processes, accounts, and maintenance workflows on Windows-based ICS assets. Preserve documented vendor and engineering dependencies.

ICST0849Masquerading

Use tools that restrict program execution via application control by attributes other than file name for common system and application utilities.

ICST1701.005PythonSub-technique

Restrict Python execution to approved interpreters, scripts, libraries, accounts, and paths. On engineering systems where Python is required, use positive allowlisting rather than disabling the interpreter.

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

mitigates · TechniqueT0863: User ExecutionICSmitigates · TechniqueT1701.004: Visual BasicICSmitigates · TechniqueT1701.003: Unix ShellICSmitigates · TechniqueT1701.001: PowerShellICSmitigates · TechniqueT0894: System Binary Proxy ExecutionICSmitigates · TechniqueT0871: Execution through APIICSmitigates · TechniqueT0834: Native APIICSmitigates · TechniqueT1701.006: JavaScriptICSmitigates · TechniqueT1701: Command and Scripting InterpreterICSmitigates · TechniqueT1701.002: Windows Command ShellICSmitigates · TechniqueT0849: MasqueradingICSmitigates · TechniqueT1701.005: PythonICS
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
733c5ff741512259...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.01.1Current bundle733c5ff74151…
19.21.0Older bundle01d298abd9be…
19.11.0Older bundle01d298abd9be…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    mitre-attackM0938
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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