M0810: Out-of-Band Communications Channel
Security context for executives and security teams
M0810: Out-of-Band Communications Channel describes Have alternative methods to support communication requirements during communication failures and data integrity attacks. (Citation: National Institute of Standards and Technology April 2013) (Citation: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency)
Executive priority
M0810: Out-of-Band Communications Channel is an official MITRE ATT&CK mitigation. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate M0810: Out-of-Band Communications Channel by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether M0810: Out-of-Band Communications Channel appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Out-of-Band Communications Channel
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| ICS | T1695.001 | Serial COMSub-technique | Ensure devices have an alternative method for communicating in the event that a valid COM port is unavailable. |
| ICS | T0815 | Denial of View | Provide operators with redundant, out-of-band communication to support monitoring and control of the operational processes, especially when recovering from a network outage [1]. Out-of-band communication should utilize diverse systems and technologies to minimize common failure modes and vulnerabilities within the communications infrastructure. For example, wireless networks (e.g., 3G, 4G) can be used to provide diverse and redundant delivery of data. |
| ICS | T0813 | Denial of Control | Provide operators with redundant, out-of-band communication to support monitoring and control of the operational processes, especially when recovering from a network outage [1]. Out-of-band communication should utilize diverse systems and technologies to minimize common failure modes and vulnerabilities within the communications infrastructure. For example, wireless networks (e.g., 3G, 4G) can be used to provide diverse and redundant delivery of data. |
| ICS | T1691.001 | Command MessageSub-technique | Provide an alternative method for sending critical command messages to outstations, this could include using radio/cell communication to send messages to a field technician that physically performs the control function. |
| ICS | T1691.002 | Reporting MessageSub-technique | Provide an alternative method for sending critical report messages to operators, this could include using radio/cell communication to obtain messages from field technicians that can locally obtain telemetry and status data. |
| ICS | T0831 | Manipulation of Control | Utilize out-of-band communication to validate the integrity of data from the primary channel. |
| ICS | T0830 | Adversary-in-the-Middle | Utilize out-of-band communication to validate the integrity of data from the primary channel. |
| ICS | T0826 | Loss of Availability | Provide operators with redundant, out-of-band communication to support monitoring and control of the operational processes, especially when recovering from a network outage [1]. Out-of-band communication should utilize diverse systems and technologies to minimize common failure modes and vulnerabilities within the communications infrastructure. For example, wireless networks (e.g., 3G, 4G) can be used to provide diverse and redundant delivery of data. |
| ICS | T0832 | Manipulation of View | Utilize out-of-band communication to validate the integrity of data from the primary channel. |
| ICS | T1695.003 | Wi-FiSub-technique | Ensure systems and devices have an alternative method for communicating in the event that Wi-Fi communication channels become unavailable. |
| ICS | T1691 | Block Operational Technology Message | Provide an alternative method for sending critical commands message to outstations, this could include using radio/cell communication to send messages to a field technician that physically performs the control function. |
| ICS | T0827 | Loss of Control | Provide operators with redundant, out-of-band communication to support monitoring and control of the operational processes, especially when recovering from a network outage [1]. Out-of-band communication should utilize diverse systems and technologies to minimize common failure modes and vulnerabilities within the communications infrastructure. For example, wireless networks (e.g., 3G, 4G) can be used to provide diverse and redundant delivery of data. |
| ICS | T1695 | Block Communications | Ensure systems and devices have an alternative method for communicating in the event that communication channels become unavailable. |
| ICS | T1695.002 | EthernetSub-technique | Ensure systems and devices have an alternative method for communicating in the event that Ethernet communication channels become unavailable. |
| ICS | T0878 | Alarm Suppression | Provide an alternative method for alarms to be reported in the event of a communication failure. |
| ICS | T0829 | Loss of View | Provide operators with redundant, out-of-band communication to support monitoring and control of the operational processes, especially when recovering from a network outage [1]. Out-of-band communication should utilize diverse systems and technologies to minimize common failure modes and vulnerabilities within the communications infrastructure. For example, wireless networks (e.g., 3G, 4G) can be used to provide diverse and redundant delivery of data. |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | 423a9719af66… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 423a9719af66… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]National Institute of Standards and Technology April 2013
National Institute of Standards and Technology 2013, April Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations Retrieved. 2020/09/17
Open source URL - [2]Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency National Institute of Standards and Technology 2013, April Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations Retrieved. 2020/09/17 Rapid Attack Detection, Isolation and Characterization Systems (RADICS) Retrieved. 2020/09/17
Open source URL - [3]mitre-attackM0810Open source URL
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