DET0031: Invalid Code Signature Execution Detection via Metadata and Behavioral Context
MITRE ATT&CK DET0031: Invalid Code Signature Execution Detection via Metadata and Behavioral Context Detection Strategy details, with detection guidance,…
Security context for executives and security teams
This detection strategy is about finding execution of software whose code-signing metadata looks trustworthy but fails validation. For leaders, the risk is not just malware execution; it is misplaced trust in labels, publishers, or signature-looking metadata that can deceive users, analysts, and security tooling. Because the linked ATT&CK technique is Invalid Code Signature, this is most relevant where Windows or macOS code-signing checks influence allowlisting, triage, or incident response decisions.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as a control-validation topic for endpoint trust, SOC triage quality, and audit evidence around software authenticity. Security leaders should ask whether the organization validates signatures cryptographically, not merely by displayed publisher metadata, and whether incident responders can quickly distinguish valid, invalid, unsigned, and tampered binaries. This matters for operational resilience because a weak signature-validation process can let suspicious execution appear benign during high-pressure incident decisions.
Technical view
The supplied ATT&CK object has no official detection text or platform field, but it detects T1036.001 Invalid Code Signature, which is associated with stealth on macOS and Windows. SOC and detection engineering teams should validate whether endpoint telemetry records executable launches together with signature status, certificate chain validation result, signer/publisher metadata, file path, hash, parent process, and behavioral context. Detection should focus on execution where code-signing metadata is present or appears legitimate but validation fails, especially when paired with suspicious process lineage or unusual file locations.
Likely telemetry
- Endpoint process execution events with file path, command line, parent process, user, and timestamp
- Code-signature validation status, including valid, invalid, unsigned, revoked, or chain-validation failure where available
- Executable file metadata such as signer, publisher, product name, original filename, and hashes
- macOS or Windows endpoint security logs where local environment supports collection
- File creation or modification events for newly introduced executables
Detection direction
- Confirm that tools distinguish cryptographically valid signatures from copied or misleading signature metadata.
- Tune detections around invalid signature execution rather than metadata presence alone to reduce false confidence in publisher-looking fields.
- Use behavioral context such as parent process, execution location, recent file creation, and user context to prioritize alerts and reduce false positives from benign broken or outdated signatures.
- Validate coverage separately for Windows and macOS only where those platforms are in organizational scope, since the detection strategy object itself does not specify platforms but the related technique does.
- Review SOC workflows to ensure analysts do not close events solely because a file displays familiar signer or product metadata.
Mitigation priorities
- Establish or verify software trust policies that rely on signature validation results, not display metadata alone.
- Ensure endpoint logging and EDR configurations preserve signature validation details for executed files.
- Use application control or allowlisting decisions based on validated signer identity and file reputation where appropriate to the environment.
- Include invalid-signature execution scenarios in incident response tabletop or detection validation exercises.
- Document evidence of signature-validation controls and monitoring for compliance or audit use where software integrity is in scope.
Additional notes and limits
MITRE provides the detection strategy name and relationship to T1036.001, but no official description or detection guidance for DET0031. The strongest supported interpretation is that the strategy concerns metadata plus behavioral detection of execution involving invalid code signatures. Local baselining is important because invalid signatures can occur in legitimate software due to packaging, update, certificate, or timestamping issues.
Platforms, tactics, and official detection text are not specified on the detection-strategy object. Windows, macOS, and stealth context come from the related Invalid Code Signature technique, not from DET0031 itself. This take does not assert active exploitation, attribution, existing customer exposure, or guaranteed detection coverage.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Invalid Code Signature Execution Detection via Metadata and Behavioral Context
No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1036.001 | Invalid Code SignatureSub-technique | This object detects Invalid Code Signature. |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 964743415fe1… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]mitre-attackDET0031Open source URL
- [2]mitre-attackDET0031Open source URL
- [3]mitre-attackDET0031Open source URL
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