AN1936: Analytic 1936
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., time of day, unusual source/destination address) that may be related to abuse of Valid Accounts to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as RDP, Telnet, SSH, and VNC. Monitor DLL file events, specifically creation of these files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as RDP, Telnet, SSH, and VNC. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or abnormal access patterns, such as multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement. For added context on adversary procedures and background see Remote Services and applicable sub-techniques. Monitor for newly executed processes related to services specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as RDP, Telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may use Valid Accounts to login and may perform follow-on actions that spawn additional processes as the user. Monitor executed commands and arguments to services specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as RDP, Telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform these actions using Valid Accounts. Monitor for newly constructed network connections into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as RDP, Telnet, SSH, and VNC. Monitor network connections involving common remote management protocols, such as ports tcp:3283 and tcp:5900, as well as ports tcp:3389 and tcp:22 for remote logins. The adversary may use Valid Accounts to enable remote logins. Monitor interactions with network shares, such as reads or file transfers, using remote services such as Server Message Block (SMB). For added context on adversary procedures and background see Remote Services and applicable sub-techniques.
Security context for executives and security teams
AN1936: Analytic 1936 describes Monitor network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., time of day, unusual source/destination address) that may be related to abuse of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859) to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as RDP, Telnet, SSH, and VNC. Monitor DLL file events, specifically creation of these files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as RDP, Telnet, SSH, and VNC. Monitor for user accoun...
Executive priority
AN1936: Analytic 1936 is an official MITRE ATT&CK detection analytic. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate AN1936: Analytic 1936 by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (None), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether AN1936: Analytic 1936 appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Analytic 1936
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., time of day, unusual source/destination address) that may be related to abuse of Valid Accounts to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as RDP, Telnet, SSH, and VNC. Monitor DLL file events, specifically creation of these files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as RDP, Telnet, SSH, and VNC. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or abnormal access patterns, such as multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement. For added context on adversary procedures and background see Remote Services and applicable sub-techniques. Monitor for newly executed processes related to services specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as RDP, Telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may use Valid Accounts to login and may perform follow-on actions that spawn additional processes as the user. Monitor executed commands and arguments to services specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as RDP, Telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform these actions using Valid Accounts. Monitor for newly constructed network connections into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as RDP, Telnet, SSH, and VNC. Monitor network connections involving common remote management protocols, such as ports tcp:3283 and tcp:5900, as well as ports tcp:3389 and tcp:22 for remote logins. The adversary may use Valid Accounts to enable remote logins. Monitor interactions with network shares, such as reads or file transfers, using remote services such as Server Message Block (SMB). For added context on adversary procedures and background see Remote Services and applicable sub-techniques.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 078678a47c70… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 078678a47c70… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]mitre-attackAN1936Open source URL
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