AN1886: Analytic 1886
Monitor for newly constructed logon behavior within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents.[1] Sharepoint audit logging can also be configured to report when a user shares a resource.[2] The user access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter.[3] Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities. In the case of detecting collection from shared network drives monitor for unexpected and abnormal accesses to network shares. Monitor for third-party application logging, messaging, and/or other artifacts that may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user-based anomalies.
Security context for executives and security teams
AN1886: Analytic 1886 describes Monitor for newly constructed logon behavior within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents.(Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging) Sharepoint audit logging can also be configured to report when a user shares a resource.(Citation: Sharepoint Sharing Events) The user access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter.(Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage...
Executive priority
AN1886: Analytic 1886 is an official MITRE ATT&CK detection analytic. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate AN1886: Analytic 1886 by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (None), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether AN1886: Analytic 1886 appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Analytic 1886
Monitor for newly constructed logon behavior within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents.[1] Sharepoint audit logging can also be configured to report when a user shares a resource.[2] The user access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter.[3] Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities. In the case of detecting collection from shared network drives monitor for unexpected and abnormal accesses to network shares. Monitor for third-party application logging, messaging, and/or other artifacts that may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user-based anomalies.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | fc7e882b543d… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | fc7e882b543d… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Microsoft SharePoint Logging
Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018.
Open source URL - [2]Sharepoint Sharing Events
Microsoft. (n.d.). Sharepoint Sharing Events. Retrieved October 8, 2021.
Open source URL - [3]Atlassian Confluence Logging
Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging. Retrieved April 4, 2018.
Open source URL - [4]mitre-attackAN1886Open source URL
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