DC0046: Drive Modification
The alteration of a drive letter, mount point, or other attributes of a data storage device, which could involve reassignment, renaming, permissions changes, or other modifications. Examples:
- Drive Letter Reassignment: A USB drive previously assigned `E:\` is reassigned to `D:\` on a Windows machine. - Mount Point Change: On a Linux system, a mounted storage device at `/mnt/external` is moved to `/mnt/storage`. - Drive Permission Changes: A shared drive's permissions are modified to allow write access for unauthorized users or processes. - Renaming of a Drive: A network drive labeled "HR_Share" is renamed to "Shared_Resources." - Modification of Cloud-Integrated Drives: A cloud storage mount such as Google Drive is modified to sync only specific folders.
This data component can be collected through the following measures:
Windows Event Logs
- Relevant Events: - Event ID 98: Indicates changes to a volume (e.g., drive letter reassignment). - Event ID 1006: Logs permission modifications or changes to removable storage. - Configuration: Enable "Storage Operational Logs" in the Event Viewer: `Applications and Services Logs > Microsoft > Windows > Storage-Tiering > Operational`
Linux System Logs
- Auditd Configuration: Add audit rules to track changes to mounted drives: `auditctl -w /mnt/ -p w -k drive_modification` - Command-Line Monitoring: Use `dmesg` or `journalctl` to observe drive modifications.
macOS System Logs
- Unified Logs: Collect mount or drive modification events: `log show --info | grep "Volume modified"` - Command-Line Monitoring: Use `diskutil` to track changes:
Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) Tools
- Configure policies in EDR solutions to monitor and log changes to drive configurations or attributes.
SIEM Tools
- Aggregate logs from multiple systems into a centralized platform like Splunk to correlate events and alert on suspicious drive modification activities.
Security context for executives and security teams
DC0046: Drive Modification describes The alteration of a drive letter, mount point, or other attributes of a data storage device, which could involve reassignment, renaming, permissions changes, or other modifications. Examples: - Drive Letter Reassignment: A USB drive previously assigned `E:\` is reassigned to `D:\` on a Windows machine. - Mount Point Change: On a Linux system, a mounted storage device at `/mnt/external` is moved to `/mnt/storage`. - Drive Permission Changes: A shared drive's permissions are modified to allow write access for unautho...
Executive priority
DC0046: Drive Modification is an official MITRE ATT&CK data component. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate DC0046: Drive Modification by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether DC0046: Drive Modification appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Drive Modification
The alteration of a drive letter, mount point, or other attributes of a data storage device, which could involve reassignment, renaming, permissions changes, or other modifications. Examples:
- Drive Letter Reassignment: A USB drive previously assigned `E:\` is reassigned to `D:\` on a Windows machine. - Mount Point Change: On a Linux system, a mounted storage device at `/mnt/external` is moved to `/mnt/storage`. - Drive Permission Changes: A shared drive's permissions are modified to allow write access for unauthorized users or processes. - Renaming of a Drive: A network drive labeled "HR_Share" is renamed to "Shared_Resources." - Modification of Cloud-Integrated Drives: A cloud storage mount such as Google Drive is modified to sync only specific folders.
This data component can be collected through the following measures:
Windows Event Logs
- Relevant Events: - Event ID 98: Indicates changes to a volume (e.g., drive letter reassignment). - Event ID 1006: Logs permission modifications or changes to removable storage. - Configuration: Enable "Storage Operational Logs" in the Event Viewer: `Applications and Services Logs > Microsoft > Windows > Storage-Tiering > Operational`
Linux System Logs
- Auditd Configuration: Add audit rules to track changes to mounted drives: `auditctl -w /mnt/ -p w -k drive_modification` - Command-Line Monitoring: Use `dmesg` or `journalctl` to observe drive modifications.
macOS System Logs
- Unified Logs: Collect mount or drive modification events: `log show --info | grep "Volume modified"` - Command-Line Monitoring: Use `diskutil` to track changes:
Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) Tools
- Configure policies in EDR solutions to monitor and log changes to drive configurations or attributes.
SIEM Tools
- Aggregate logs from multiple systems into a centralized platform like Splunk to correlate events and alert on suspicious drive modification activities.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 2.0 | Older bundle | 6320ff650d2d… | ||
| 19.2 | 2.0 | Current bundle | 6320ff650d2d… | ||
| 19.1 | 2.0 | Older bundle | 6320ff650d2d… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]mitre-attackDC0046Open source URL
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