DC0035: Process Access
Refers to an event where one process attempts to open another process, typically to inspect or manipulate its memory, access handles, or modify execution flow. Monitoring these access attempts can provide valuable insight into both benign and malicious behaviors, such as debugging, inter-process communication (IPC), or process injection.
*Data Collection Measures:*
- Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) Tools: - EDR solutions that provide telemetry on inter-process access and memory manipulation. - Sysmon (Windows): - Event ID 10: Captures process access attempts, including: - Source process (initiator) - Target process (victim) - Access rights requested - Process ID correlation - Windows Event Logs: - Event ID 4656 (Audit Handle to an Object): Logs access attempts to system objects. - Event ID 4690 (Attempted Process Modification): Can help identify unauthorized process changes. - Linux/macOS Monitoring: - AuditD: Monitors process access through syscall tracing (e.g., `ptrace`, `open`, `read`, `write`). - eBPF/XDP: Used for low-level monitoring of kernel process access. - OSQuery: Query process access behavior via structured SQL-like logging. - Procmon (Process Monitor) and Debugging Tools: - Windows Procmon: Captures real-time process interactions. - Linux strace / ptrace: Useful for tracking process behavior at the system call level.
Security context for executives and security teams
DC0035: Process Access describes Refers to an event where one process attempts to open another process, typically to inspect or manipulate its memory, access handles, or modify execution flow. Monitoring these access attempts can provide valuable insight into both benign and malicious behaviors, such as debugging, inter-process communication (IPC), or process injection. *Data Collection Measures:* - Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) Tools: - EDR solutions that provide telemetry on inter-process access and memory manipulation. - Sysmon (Windows...
Executive priority
DC0035: Process Access is an official MITRE ATT&CK data component. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate DC0035: Process Access by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether DC0035: Process Access appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Process Access
Refers to an event where one process attempts to open another process, typically to inspect or manipulate its memory, access handles, or modify execution flow. Monitoring these access attempts can provide valuable insight into both benign and malicious behaviors, such as debugging, inter-process communication (IPC), or process injection.
*Data Collection Measures:*
- Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) Tools: - EDR solutions that provide telemetry on inter-process access and memory manipulation. - Sysmon (Windows): - Event ID 10: Captures process access attempts, including: - Source process (initiator) - Target process (victim) - Access rights requested - Process ID correlation - Windows Event Logs: - Event ID 4656 (Audit Handle to an Object): Logs access attempts to system objects. - Event ID 4690 (Attempted Process Modification): Can help identify unauthorized process changes. - Linux/macOS Monitoring: - AuditD: Monitors process access through syscall tracing (e.g., `ptrace`, `open`, `read`, `write`). - eBPF/XDP: Used for low-level monitoring of kernel process access. - OSQuery: Query process access behavior via structured SQL-like logging. - Procmon (Process Monitor) and Debugging Tools: - Windows Procmon: Captures real-time process interactions. - Linux strace / ptrace: Useful for tracking process behavior at the system call level.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 3.0 | Older bundle | ea30c53403fa… | ||
| 19.2 | 3.0 | Current bundle | 0d364b3db18f… | ||
| 19.1 | 3.0 | Older bundle | 0d364b3db18f… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]mitre-attackDC0035Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.