DC0031: Kernel Module Load
The process of loading a kernel module into the operating system kernel. Kernel modules are object files that extend the kernel’s functionality, such as adding support for device drivers, new filesystems, or additional system calls. This action can be legitimate (e.g., loading a driver) or malicious (e.g., adding a rootkit).
*Data Collection Measures:*
- Linux: - Auditd: Enable auditing of kernel module loading. Example rule: `-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module,delete_module`. - Syslog: Monitor `/var/log/syslog` or `/var/log/messages` for entries related to kernel module loads. - Systemd Journal: Use `journalctl` to query logs for module loading events: `journalctl -k | grep "Loading kernel module"` - macOS: - Unified Logs: Use the `log` command to query kernel module events: `log show --predicate 'eventMessage contains "kextload"' --info` - Endpoint Security Framework (ESF): Monitor for `ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_KEXTLOAD` (kernel extension loading events). - Kernel-Specific Tools: - Lsmod: Use `lsmod` to list loaded kernel modules in real-time. - Kprobe/eBPF: Use extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) or Kernel Probes (kprobes) to monitor kernel events, including module loading. Example using eBPF tools like BCC: `sudo python /path/to/bcc/tools/kprobe -v do_init_module` - Enable EDR Monitoring: - Configure alerts for: Suspicious kernel module loads from non-standard paths (e.g., /tmp). Unexpected or unsigned kernel modules. - Review detailed telemetry data provided by the EDR for insight into who initiated the module load, the file path, and whether the module was signed.
Security context for executives and security teams
DC0031: Kernel Module Load describes The process of loading a kernel module into the operating system kernel. Kernel modules are object files that extend the kernel’s functionality, such as adding support for device drivers, new filesystems, or additional system calls. This action can be legitimate (e.g., loading a driver) or malicious (e.g., adding a rootkit). *Data Collection Measures:* - Linux: - Auditd: Enable auditing of kernel module loading. Example rule: `-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module,delete_module`. - Syslog: Monitor `/var/log/sys...
Executive priority
DC0031: Kernel Module Load is an official MITRE ATT&CK data component. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate DC0031: Kernel Module Load by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether DC0031: Kernel Module Load appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Kernel Module Load
The process of loading a kernel module into the operating system kernel. Kernel modules are object files that extend the kernel’s functionality, such as adding support for device drivers, new filesystems, or additional system calls. This action can be legitimate (e.g., loading a driver) or malicious (e.g., adding a rootkit).
*Data Collection Measures:*
- Linux: - Auditd: Enable auditing of kernel module loading. Example rule: `-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module,delete_module`. - Syslog: Monitor `/var/log/syslog` or `/var/log/messages` for entries related to kernel module loads. - Systemd Journal: Use `journalctl` to query logs for module loading events: `journalctl -k | grep "Loading kernel module"` - macOS: - Unified Logs: Use the `log` command to query kernel module events: `log show --predicate 'eventMessage contains "kextload"' --info` - Endpoint Security Framework (ESF): Monitor for `ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_KEXTLOAD` (kernel extension loading events). - Kernel-Specific Tools: - Lsmod: Use `lsmod` to list loaded kernel modules in real-time. - Kprobe/eBPF: Use extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) or Kernel Probes (kprobes) to monitor kernel events, including module loading. Example using eBPF tools like BCC: `sudo python /path/to/bcc/tools/kprobe -v do_init_module` - Enable EDR Monitoring: - Configure alerts for: Suspicious kernel module loads from non-standard paths (e.g., /tmp). Unexpected or unsigned kernel modules. - Review detailed telemetry data provided by the EDR for insight into who initiated the module load, the file path, and whether the module was signed.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 2.0 | Older bundle | d0063dd99d6d… | ||
| 19.2 | 2.0 | Current bundle | d0063dd99d6d… | ||
| 19.1 | 2.0 | Older bundle | d0063dd99d6d… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]mitre-attackDC0031Open source URL
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