DC0030: Pod Modification
Changes made to a pod’s configuration or control data within a containerized cluster. This can include updating settings such as resource limits, environment variables, annotations, labels, or even the containers running within the pod. Pod modifications are often executed using commands like kubectl set, kubectl patch, or kubectl edit.
*Data Collection Measures:*
- Kubernetes API Server Audit Logs: - Capture all API calls related to pod modification, such as PATCH, PUT, or UPDATE methods on v1/pods. - Runtime Security Tools: - Tools like Falco, Sysdig, and Kube-bench can monitor pod modifications at runtime and alert on policy violations. - Container Orchestration Logs: - Monitor events logged by Kubernetes itself (e.g., `kubectl logs -n kube-system kube-controller-manager`). - SIEM and EDR Solutions: - Use SIEM platforms (e.g., Splunk) to aggregate API server logs and detect patterns of unauthorized or suspicious pod modifications. - Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools configured with container visibility can monitor commands like `kubectl` set or `kubectl patch`. - Host-Based Monitoring: - Collect and analyze logs for processes executing `kubectl` commands or interacting with Kubernetes configuration files (e.g., `.kube/config`).
Security context for executives and security teams
DC0030: Pod Modification describes Changes made to a pod’s configuration or control data within a containerized cluster. This can include updating settings such as resource limits, environment variables, annotations, labels, or even the containers running within the pod. Pod modifications are often executed using commands like kubectl set, kubectl patch, or kubectl edit. *Data Collection Measures:* - Kubernetes API Server Audit Logs: - Capture all API calls related to pod modification, such as PATCH, PUT, or UPDATE methods on v1/pods. - Runtime Secu...
Executive priority
DC0030: Pod Modification is an official MITRE ATT&CK data component. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate DC0030: Pod Modification by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether DC0030: Pod Modification appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Pod Modification
Changes made to a pod’s configuration or control data within a containerized cluster. This can include updating settings such as resource limits, environment variables, annotations, labels, or even the containers running within the pod. Pod modifications are often executed using commands like kubectl set, kubectl patch, or kubectl edit.
*Data Collection Measures:*
- Kubernetes API Server Audit Logs: - Capture all API calls related to pod modification, such as PATCH, PUT, or UPDATE methods on v1/pods. - Runtime Security Tools: - Tools like Falco, Sysdig, and Kube-bench can monitor pod modifications at runtime and alert on policy violations. - Container Orchestration Logs: - Monitor events logged by Kubernetes itself (e.g., `kubectl logs -n kube-system kube-controller-manager`). - SIEM and EDR Solutions: - Use SIEM platforms (e.g., Splunk) to aggregate API server logs and detect patterns of unauthorized or suspicious pod modifications. - Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools configured with container visibility can monitor commands like `kubectl` set or `kubectl patch`. - Host-Based Monitoring: - Collect and analyze logs for processes executing `kubectl` commands or interacting with Kubernetes configuration files (e.g., `.kube/config`).
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 2.0 | Older bundle | c93e5743a455… | ||
| 19.2 | 2.0 | Current bundle | c93e5743a455… | ||
| 19.1 | 2.0 | Older bundle | c93e5743a455… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]mitre-attackDC0030Open source URL
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