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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1575: Native API

Adversaries may use Android’s Native Development Kit (NDK) to write native functions that can achieve execution of binaries or functions. Like system calls on a traditional desktop operating system, native code achieves execution on a lower level than normal Android SDK calls.

The NDK allows developers to write native code in C or C++ that is compiled directly to machine code, avoiding all intermediate languages and steps in compilation that higher level languages, like Java, typically have. The Java Native Interface (JNI) is the component that allows Java functions in the Android app to call functions in a native library.[1]

Adversaries may also choose to use native functions to execute malicious code since native actions are typically much more difficult to analyze than standard, non-native behaviors.[2]

MobileT1575TechniqueObject v2.0 Modified
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Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence Medium

Native API matters because Android apps can move sensitive or malicious logic into native C/C++ code through the NDK and JNI, making behavior harder to review than ordinary Android SDK or Java-layer activity. For leaders, the practical issue is not that native code is inherently bad; it is that mobile app vetting, SOC triage, and incident response may miss risky behavior if they only inspect higher-level app logic.

Executive priority

Prioritize this where Android devices are part of executive, workforce, regulated, or operational workflows. The ATT&CK relationships tie this technique to multiple Android malware families, including banking trojans, surveillanceware, ad fraud, backdoors, and cloaking-heavy malware, so mobile security programs should be able to prove how they review apps that use native code and how they respond when such apps appear on managed devices. This is also useful audit evidence for mobile application governance and BYOD/managed-device risk decisions.

Technical view

For SOC, detection engineering, and IR teams, validate Android-focused coverage for apps that include native functions invoked through JNI or NDK-built components. Because ATT&CK provides no official detection text for T1575, coverage should be tested through app-vetting outputs, mobile device telemetry, and any available detection strategy content for DET0717. Treat native API usage as a risk signal requiring context, not a standalone malicious indicator, because legitimate Android applications also use native code for performance or compatibility.

Likely telemetry

  • Android application inventory and package metadata from managed devices
  • Mobile app-vetting or static-analysis results identifying NDK/JNI/native-library use
  • Runtime execution telemetry showing app behavior below the normal Android SDK layer, where available
  • Mobile threat defense, EDR, or malware alerts associated with suspicious Android applications
  • Application install source, signing, version, and update history

Detection direction

  • Confirm whether mobile app-vetting tools inspect native code paths rather than only Java or manifest-level behavior.
  • Tune detections so native API usage increases scrutiny but does not automatically create high-severity alerts without suspicious behavior or app-risk context.
  • Review DET0717, where available, to understand what it actually detects and what telemetry it requires.
  • Correlate native-code findings with app provenance, requested capabilities, unusual runtime behavior, and known malicious software relationships such as Bread, CarbonSteal, Asacub, HenBox, TERRACOTTA, CHEMISTGAMES, Chameleon, LightSpy, GodFather, and DocSwap.
  • Document blind spots where Android devices are unmanaged, app vetting is not enforced, or native components cannot be analyzed by existing tools.

Mitigation priorities

  • Require review of Android applications that use NDK/JNI native code, especially before approving apps for managed or sensitive-user devices.
  • Maintain an approved application inventory and investigate unexpected apps or updates that introduce native components.
  • Use mobile security controls and incident response procedures that can collect app packages and device context for deeper analysis.
  • Apply risk-based restrictions for untrusted or unreviewed applications on devices used for privileged, executive, financial, or regulated workflows.
  • Capture evidence of app review, mobile policy enforcement, and exception handling for compliance and governance needs.
Analyst notes and limits

The object is an Android mobile ATT&CK technique with no specified tactics and no official detection text. Its significance is supported by ATT&CK relationships to multiple malware/software entries and one detection strategy, but local defensive value depends on whether the organization manages Android devices and performs meaningful mobile app analysis.

This take is based only on the supplied ATT&CK fields, external references, and relationships. It does not establish current exploitation, customer exposure, attribution, or guaranteed detection coverage. One related campaign, Operation Triangulation, is described as iOS-focused while the technique platform is Android, so platform-specific conclusions should rely on the official technique platform and local evidence.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Native API

Adversaries may use Android’s Native Development Kit (NDK) to write native functions that can achieve execution of binaries or functions. Like system calls on a traditional desktop operating system, native code achieves execution on a lower level than normal Android SDK calls.

The NDK allows developers to write native code in C or C++ that is compiled directly to machine code, avoiding all intermediate languages and steps in compilation that higher level languages, like Java, typically have. The Java Native Interface (JNI) is the component that allows Java functions in the Android app to call functions in a native library.[1]

Adversaries may also choose to use native functions to execute malicious code since native actions are typically much more difficult to analyze than standard, non-native behaviors.[2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Malware Mobile

S1083: Chameleon

Chameleon is an Android banking trojan that can leverage Android’s Accessibility Services to perform malicious activities. Believed to have been first active in January 2023, Chameleon has been observed targeting users in Australia and Poland by masquerading as official applications. A new variant of Chameleon has expanded its targets to include Android users in the United Kingdom and Italy.[1][2]

Android
Malware Mobile

S9005: DocSwap

DocSwap is an Android malware first identified in 2025, and attributed to Kimsuky. DocSwap’s name is a combination of its Korean name “문서열람 인증 앱” (Document Viewing Authentication App) and a phishing page masquerading as CoinSwap at the C2 address. Based on DocSwap’s name and Korean-language strings, DocSwap potentially targets mobile device users in South Korea. Several variants of DocSwap exist; one of the latest samples indicates that the adversary added a native decryption function that decrypts an internal APK.[1][2]

Android
Malware Mobile

S0544: HenBox

HenBox is Android malware that attempts to only execute on Xiaomi devices running the MIUI operating system. HenBox has primarily been used to target Uyghurs, a minority Turkic ethnic group.[1]

Android
Malware Mobile

S1231: GodFather

GodFather is an Android banking malware that uses virtualization to mimic legitimate applications and abuses accessibility services and other permissions to evade detection and exfiltrate sensitive data. First identified in 2020, GodFather targets nearly 500 banking applications, cryptocurrency wallets, and exchanges worldwide; however, its virtualization-based attacks have primarily focused on several Turkish financial institutions. This capability enables threat actors to steal banking credentials and other sensitive account information. [1][2]

Android
Malware Mobile

S0540: Asacub

Asacub is a banking trojan that attempts to steal money from victims’ bank accounts. It attempts to do this by initiating a wire transfer via SMS message from compromised devices.[1]

Android
Malware Mobile

S0432: Bread

Bread was a large-scale billing fraud malware family known for employing many different cloaking and obfuscation techniques in an attempt to continuously evade Google Play Store’s malware detection. 1,700 unique Bread apps were detected and removed from the Google Play Store before being downloaded by users.[1]

Android
Malware Mobile

S1185: LightSpy

First observed in 2018, LightSpy is a modular malware family that initially targeted iOS devices in Southern Asia before expanding to Android and macOS platforms. It consists of a downloader, a main executable that manages network communications, and functionality-specific modules, typically implemented as `.dylib` files (iOS, macOS) or `.apk` files (Android). LightSpy can collect VoIP call recordings, SMS messages, and credential stores, which are then exfiltrated to a command and control (C2) server.[1]

AndroidWindowsiOS
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · Malware S1083: Chameleon Mobile uses · Malware S0545: TERRACOTTA Mobile uses · Malware S9005: DocSwap Mobile uses · Malware S0544: HenBox Mobile uses · Malware S1231: GodFather Mobile uses · Malware S0540: Asacub Mobile uses · Malware S0529: CarbonSteal Mobile uses · Malware S0555: CHEMISTGAMES Mobile uses · Campaign C0054: Operation Triangulation Mobile uses · Malware S0432: Bread Mobile detects · Detection Strategy DET0717: Detection of Native API Mobile uses · Malware S1185: LightSpy Mobile
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
2.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
5dbaa699e30e7d0b...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 2.0 Current bundle 5dbaa699e30e…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Google NDK Getting Started

    Google. (2019, December 27). Getting Started with the NDK. Retrieved April 28, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    MITRE App Vetting Effectiveness

    M. Peck, C. Northern. (2016, August 22). Analyzing the Effectiveness of App Vetting Tools in the Enterprise. Retrieved April 28, 2020.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    mitre-attack T1575
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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