T1533: Data from Local System
Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to exfiltration.
Access to local system data, which includes information stored by the operating system, often requires escalated privileges. Examples of local system data include authentication tokens, the device keyboard cache, Wi-Fi passwords, and photos. On Android, adversaries may also attempt to access files from external storage which may require additional storage-related permissions.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
T1533 matters because mobile devices often contain business-relevant secrets outside traditional endpoint visibility: authentication tokens, local databases, keyboard cache data, Wi-Fi passwords, photos, and files on device or external storage. If an adversary or malicious app can read those local sources, the incident may become an identity, privacy, and data-loss problem before the organization sees network exfiltration.
Executive priority
Treat this as a mobile security and identity-risk control question: which corporate or BYOD devices can store sensitive tokens or business data locally, and can security teams prove they can detect suspicious access to that data? Priority is highest for executives, regulated users, critical infrastructure personnel, and roles where mobile compromise could expose credentials, surveillance data, or operational information. This also affects audit readiness because many organizations lack evidence showing what mobile data access is logged, retained, and reviewable.
Technical view
The ATT&CK object applies to Android and iOS and describes adversaries searching local file systems or databases for sensitive data before exfiltration. ATT&CK provides no official detection text and no tactic mapping, but a related detection strategy, DET0713, is listed. SOC and IR teams should validate mobile coverage around app permissions, escalated privilege/root or jailbreak indicators, access to local databases and files where observable, Android external storage access permissions, and correlation with suspicious outbound activity. Relationship context shows this behavior across multiple Android malware families and several iOS-related campaigns or tools, so detection should not be limited to one platform or one malware name.
Likely telemetry
- Mobile device management or enterprise mobility management inventory and compliance state
- Installed mobile app inventory and app provenance where available
- Android permission requests and grants, especially storage-related permissions
- Root, jailbreak, or other escalated-privilege indicators
- Mobile OS security logs and application behavior telemetry where collected
Detection direction
- Confirm whether DET0713 or equivalent mobile detections are implemented and mapped to T1533.
- Do not rely only on network exfiltration alerts; local data collection may occur before data leaves the device.
- Tune for combinations of risk signals: unusual app permissions, storage/database access, privilege escalation state, and sensitive user role.
- Separate expected enterprise apps that legitimately read local data from unknown, sideloaded, repackaged, or suspicious apps to reduce false positives.
- Validate Android-specific visibility into external storage access; confirm iOS visibility limitations, especially on unmanaged or jailbroken devices.
Mitigation priorities
- Prioritize mobile device management controls for high-risk users and sensitive business functions.
- Restrict or review apps with broad local storage access and require trusted app sources where policy allows.
- Enforce mobile OS hygiene, timely updates, and controls that identify rooted or jailbroken devices before they access enterprise resources.
- Reduce local persistence of sensitive enterprise data and tokens where feasible through app configuration and identity policy.
- Correlate mobile posture with conditional access decisions so risky devices do not retain privileged access.
Analyst notes and limits
The most important defensive question is not whether T1533 exists, but whether the organization has enough mobile telemetry to distinguish legitimate local data access from spyware, banking trojans, or surveillanceware behavior. The supplied relationships show use by multiple Android software entries and iOS-related campaigns/software, including Operation Dust Storm, Operation Triangulation, Windshift, Gooligan, RCSAndroid, Dendroid, SpyNote RAT, Stealth Mango, Tangelo, Exodus, Gustuff, Monokle, FlexiSpy, ViceLeaker, GolfSpy, Anubis, Ginp, Corona Updates, Concipit1248, TrickMo, INSOMNIA, WolfRAT, and Desert Scorpion.
ATT&CK provides no official detection text and no tactics for this object. Platform support is limited to Android and iOS as supplied. Local observability varies significantly by mobile OS version, management state, privacy settings, and security tooling, so local validation is required before claiming detection coverage.
Data from Local System
Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to exfiltration.
Access to local system data, which includes information stored by the operating system, often requires escalated privileges. Examples of local system data include authentication tokens, the device keyboard cache, Wi-Fi passwords, and photos. On Android, adversaries may also attempt to access files from external storage which may require additional storage-related permissions.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0112: Windshift
S1195: SpyC23
SpyC23 is a mobile malware that has been used by APT-C-23 since at least 2017. SpyC23 has been observed primarily targeting Android devices in the Middle East.[1]
There are multiple close variants of SpyC23, such as VAMP[2], GnatSpy[3], Desert Scorpion and FrozenCell, which add some additional functionality but are not significantly different from the original malware.
S1080: Fakecalls
S0655: BusyGasper
BusyGasper is Android spyware that has been in use since May 2016. There have been less than 10 victims, all who appear to be located in Russia, that were all infected via physical access to the device.[1]
S1083: Chameleon
Chameleon is an Android banking trojan that can leverage Android’s Accessibility Services to perform malicious activities. Believed to have been first active in January 2023, Chameleon has been observed targeting users in Australia and Poland by masquerading as official applications. A new variant of Chameleon has expanded its targets to include Android users in the United Kingdom and Italy.[1][2]
S0422: Anubis
S1095: AhRat
AhRat is an Android remote access tool based on the open-source AhMyth remote access tool. AhRat initially spread in August 2022 on the Google Play Store via an update containing malicious code to the previously benign application, “iRecorder – Screen Recorder,” which itself was released in September 2021.[1]
S1241: RatMilad
RatMilad is an Android remote access tool (RAT) with spyware functionality that has been used to target enterprise mobile devices in the Middle East since at least 2021. Variants of RatMilad have been disguised as VPN applications and a fake app named NumRent. Upon installation, RatMilad employs multiple Collection techniques to collect sensitive information before uploading the collected data to its command and control (C2) server. [1]
S0406: Gustuff
S0577: FrozenCell
FrozenCell is the mobile component of a family of surveillanceware, with a corresponding desktop component known as KasperAgent and Micropsia.[1]
There are multiple close variants of FrozenCell, such as VAMP[2], GnatSpy[3], Desert Scorpion and SpyC23, which add some additional functionality but are not significantly different from the original malware.
S1069: TangleBot
TangleBot is SMS malware that was initially observed in September 2021, primarily targeting mobile users in the United States and Canada. TangleBot has used SMS text message lures about COVID-19 regulations and vaccines to trick mobile users into downloading the malware, similar to FluBot Android malware campaigns.[1]
S1082: Sunbird
S0425: Corona Updates
Corona Updates is Android spyware that took advantage of the Coronavirus pandemic. The campaign distributing this spyware is tracked as Project Spy. Multiple variants of this spyware have been discovered to have been hosted on the Google Play Store.[1]
C0054: Operation Triangulation
Operation Triangulation is a mobile campaign targeting iOS devices.[1] The unidentified actors used zero-click exploits in iMessage attachments to gain Initial Access, then executed exploits and validators, such as Binary Validator before finally executing the TriangleDB implant.
C0016: Operation Dust Storm
Operation Dust Storm was a long-standing persistent cyber espionage campaign that targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. By 2015, the Operation Dust Storm threat actors shifted from government and defense-related intelligence targets to Japanese companies or Japanese subdivisions of larger foreign organizations supporting Japan's critical infrastructure, including electricity generation, oil and natural gas, finance, transportation, and construction.[1]
Operation Dust Storm threat actors also began to use Android backdoors in their operations by 2015, with all identified victims at the time residing in Japan or South Korea.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Current bundle | 315a45f216c0… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue STA-41Open source URL
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[2]
mitre-attack T1533Open source URL
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