T1444: Masquerade as Legitimate Application
An adversary could distribute developed malware by masquerading the malware as a legitimate application. This can be done in two different ways: by embedding the malware in a legitimate application, or by pretending to be a legitimate application.
Embedding the malware in a legitimate application is done by downloading the application, disassembling it, adding the malicious code, and then re-assembling it.[1] The app would appear to be the original app, but would contain additional malicious functionality. The adversary could then publish the malicious application to app stores or use another delivery method.
Pretending to be a legitimate application relies heavily on lack of scrutinization by the user. Typically, a malicious app pretending to be a legitimate one will have many similar details as the legitimate one, such as name, icon, and description.[2]
Malicious applications may also masquerade as legitimate applications when requesting access to the accessibility service in order to appear as legitimate to the user, increasing the likelihood that the access will be granted.
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Masquerade as Legitimate Application
An adversary could distribute developed malware by masquerading the malware as a legitimate application. This can be done in two different ways: by embedding the malware in a legitimate application, or by pretending to be a legitimate application.
Embedding the malware in a legitimate application is done by downloading the application, disassembling it, adding the malicious code, and then re-assembling it.[1] The app would appear to be the original app, but would contain additional malicious functionality. The adversary could then publish the malicious application to app stores or use another delivery method.
Pretending to be a legitimate application relies heavily on lack of scrutinization by the user. Typically, a malicious app pretending to be a legitimate one will have many similar details as the legitimate one, such as name, icon, and description.[2]
Malicious applications may also masquerade as legitimate applications when requesting access to the accessibility service in order to appear as legitimate to the user, increasing the likelihood that the access will be granted.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
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Object version and sync metadata
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Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 2.1 | Current bundle Deprecated | 82f752ec5c77… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
Zhou
Yajin Zhou and Xuxian Jiang. (2012, May). Dissecting Android Malware: Characterization and Evolution. Retrieved December 9, 2016.
Open source URL -
[2]
Palo Alto HenBox
A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.
Open source URL -
[3]
NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue APP-14Open source URL
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[4]
NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue APP-31Open source URL
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[5]
mitre-attack T1444Open source URL
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