T1408: Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators
An adversary could use knowledge of the techniques used by security software to evade detection[1][2]. For example, some mobile security products perform compromised device detection by searching for particular artifacts such as an installed "su" binary, but that check could be evaded by naming the binary something else. Similarly, polymorphic code techniques could be used to evade signature-based detection[3].
This ATT&CK object is revoked or deprecated in the current MITRE ATT&CK release.
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Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators
An adversary could use knowledge of the techniques used by security software to evade detection[1][2]. For example, some mobile security products perform compromised device detection by searching for particular artifacts such as an installed "su" binary, but that check could be evaded by naming the binary something else. Similarly, polymorphic code techniques could be used to evade signature-based detection[3].
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobile | T1630.003 | Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators Sub-technique | This object revoked by Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators. |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
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Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Current bundle Revoked | e30967e90bc9… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
Brodie
Daniel Brodie. (2016). Practical Attacks against Mobile Device Management (MDM). Retrieved December 21, 2016.
Open source URL -
[2]
Tan
Vincent Tan. (2016, August). BAD FOR ENTERPRISE: ATTACKING BYOD ENTERPRISE MOBILE SECURITY SOLUTIONS. Retrieved February 4, 2017.
Open source URL -
[3]
Rastogi
Vaibhav Rastogi, Yan Chen, and Xuxian Jiang. (2013, May). DroidChameleon: Evaluating Android Anti-malware against Transformation Attacks. Retrieved December 9, 2016.
Open source URL -
[4]
NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue EMM-5Open source URL
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[5]
mitre-attack T1408Open source URL
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