T1405: Exploit TEE Vulnerability
A malicious app or other attack vector could be used to exploit vulnerabilities in code running within the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) [1]. The adversary could then obtain privileges held by the TEE potentially including the ability to access cryptographic keys or other sensitive data [2]. Escalated operating system privileges may be first required in order to have the ability to attack the TEE [3]. If not, privileges within the TEE can potentially be used to exploit the operating system [4].
This ATT&CK object is revoked or deprecated in the current MITRE ATT&CK release.
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Exploit TEE Vulnerability
A malicious app or other attack vector could be used to exploit vulnerabilities in code running within the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) [1]. The adversary could then obtain privileges held by the TEE potentially including the ability to access cryptographic keys or other sensitive data [2]. Escalated operating system privileges may be first required in order to have the ability to attack the TEE [3]. If not, privileges within the TEE can potentially be used to exploit the operating system [4].
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
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Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle Deprecated | dcd2c66579ff… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
Thomas-TrustZone
Josh Thomas and Charles Holmes. (2015, September). An infestation of dragons: Exploring vulnerabilities in the ARM TrustZone architecture. Retrieved December 9, 2016.
Open source URL -
[2]
QualcommKeyMaster
laginimaineb. (2016, June). Extracting Qualcomm's KeyMaster Keys - Breaking Android Full Disk Encryption. Retrieved December 9, 2016.
Open source URL -
[3]
EkbergTEE
Jan-Erik Ekberg. (2015, September 10). Android and trusted execution environments. Retrieved December 9, 2016.
Open source URL -
[4]
laginimaineb-TEE
laginimaineb. (2016, May). War of the Worlds - Hijacking the Linux Kernel from QSEE. Retrieved December 21, 2016.
Open source URL -
[5]
NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue APP-27Open source URL
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[6]
mitre-attack T1405Open source URL
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