T1208: Kerberoasting
Service principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service [1]). [2] [3] [4] [5]
Adversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC). [6] [7] Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline Brute Force attacks that may expose plaintext credentials. [7] [6] [5]
This same attack could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic. [7]
Cracked hashes may enable Persistence, Privilege Escalation, and Lateral Movement via access to Valid Accounts. [4]
This ATT&CK object is revoked or deprecated in the current MITRE ATT&CK release.
It remains available for historical context and inbound links. Use current ATT&CK relationships and replacement guidance before basing detection or reporting work on this page.
Analyst summary pending validation
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Kerberoasting
Service principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service [1]). [2] [3] [4] [5]
Adversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC). [6] [7] Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline Brute Force attacks that may expose plaintext credentials. [7] [6] [5]
This same attack could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic. [7]
Cracked hashes may enable Persistence, Privilege Escalation, and Lateral Movement via access to Valid Accounts. [4]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1558.003 | Kerberoasting Sub-technique | This object revoked by Kerberoasting. |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Current bundle Revoked | 3571c9cbf754… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018
Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.
Open source URL -
[2]
Microsoft SPN
Microsoft. (n.d.). Service Principal Names. Retrieved March 22, 2018.
Open source URL -
[3]
Microsoft SetSPN
Microsoft. (2010, April 13). Service Principal Names (SPNs) SetSPN Syntax (Setspn.exe). Retrieved March 22, 2018.
Open source URL -
[4]
SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014
Medin, T. (2014, November). Attacking Kerberos - Kicking the Guard Dog of Hades. Retrieved March 22, 2018.
Open source URL -
[5]
Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016
Schroeder, W. (2016, November 1). Kerberoasting Without Mimikatz. Retrieved March 23, 2018.
Open source URL -
[6]
Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016
EmpireProject. (2016, October 31). Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1. Retrieved March 22, 2018.
Open source URL -
[7]
AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015
Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.
Open source URL -
[8]
mitre-attack T1208Open source URL
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