T1175: Component Object Model and Distributed COM
**This technique has been deprecated. Please use Distributed Component Object Model and Component Object Model.**
Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) and Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) for local code execution or to execute on remote systems as part of lateral movement.
COM is a component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces.[1] Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).[2] DCOM is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of Component Object Model (COM) [2] beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology.[1]
Permissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry. [3][4][5] By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.
Adversaries may abuse COM for local command and/or payload execution. Various COM interfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary execution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and VBScript.[2] Specific COM objects also exists to directly perform functions beyond code execution, such as creating a Scheduled Task/Job, fileless download/execution, and other adversary behaviors such as Privilege Escalation and Persistence.[1][6]
Adversaries may use DCOM for lateral movement. Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications [7] as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.[8][9] DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents [10] and may also invoke Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application [11], bypassing the need for a malicious document.
This ATT&CK object is revoked or deprecated in the current MITRE ATT&CK release.
It remains available for historical context and inbound links. Use current ATT&CK relationships and replacement guidance before basing detection or reporting work on this page.
Analyst summary pending validation
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Component Object Model and Distributed COM
**This technique has been deprecated. Please use Distributed Component Object Model and Component Object Model.**
Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) and Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) for local code execution or to execute on remote systems as part of lateral movement.
COM is a component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces.[1] Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).[2] DCOM is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of Component Object Model (COM) [2] beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology.[1]
Permissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry. [3][4][5] By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.
Adversaries may abuse COM for local command and/or payload execution. Various COM interfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary execution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and VBScript.[2] Specific COM objects also exists to directly perform functions beyond code execution, such as creating a Scheduled Task/Job, fileless download/execution, and other adversary behaviors such as Privilege Escalation and Persistence.[1][6]
Adversaries may use DCOM for lateral movement. Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications [7] as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.[8][9] DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents [10] and may also invoke Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application [11], bypassing the need for a malicious document.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
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Object version and sync metadata
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Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 2.1 | Current bundle Deprecated | 1aa19f0c7685… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019
Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.
Open source URL -
[2]
Microsoft COM
Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November 22, 2017.
Open source URL -
[3]
Microsoft COM ACL
Microsoft. (n.d.). DCOM Security Enhancements in Windows XP Service Pack 2 and Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1. Retrieved November 22, 2017.
Open source URL -
[4]
Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys
Microsoft. (n.d.). Setting Process-Wide Security Through the Registry. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
Open source URL -
[5]
Microsoft System Wide Com Keys
Microsoft. (n.d.). Registry Values for System-Wide Security. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
Open source URL -
[6]
ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018
Forshaw, J. (2018, April 18). Windows Exploitation Tricks: Exploiting Arbitrary File Writes for Local Elevation of Privilege. Retrieved May 3, 2018.
Open source URL -
[7]
Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017
Nelson, M. (2017, November 16). Lateral Movement using Outlook's CreateObject Method and DotNetToJScript. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
Open source URL -
[8]
Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017
Nelson, M. (2017, January 5). Lateral Movement using the MMC20 Application COM Object. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
Open source URL -
[9]
Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017
Nelson, M. (2017, January 23). Lateral Movement via DCOM: Round 2. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
Open source URL -
[10]
Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017
Nelson, M. (2017, September 11). Lateral Movement using Excel.Application and DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
Open source URL -
[11]
Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017
Tsukerman, P. (2017, November 8). Leveraging Excel DDE for lateral movement via DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
Open source URL -
[12]
mitre-attack T1175Open source URL
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